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PRIOR  ART  IN  THE  DISTRICT  COURT
Stephen Yelderman*
This Article is an empirical study of the evidence district courts rely upon when invalidat-
ing patents.  To construct our dataset, we collected every district court ruling, verdict form, and
opinion (whether reported or unreported) invalidating a patent claim over a six-and-a-half-year
period.  We then coded individual invalidity rulings based on the prior art supporting the court’s
decision, observing 3320 invalidation events relying on 817 distinct prior art references.
The nature of the prior art relied upon to invalidate patents is relevant to two distinct sets of
policy questions.  First, this data sheds light on the value of district court litigation as an error-
correction tool.  As prior work has shown, the public interest in revoking erroneous patent grants
depends on the reason those grants were undeserved.  Second, this data sheds light on the feasibil-
ity of discovering invalidating prior art during patent examination.  Depending on the ease of
finding the relevant prior art, it may or may not be cost effective to replace patent litigation with
a different approach to error correction, such as investing more effort in examination-stage
scrutiny.
The conclusions here are mixed.  On one hand, invalidations for lack of novelty bear many
indicia of publicly beneficial error correction.  Anticipation based on obscure prior art appears to
be quite rare.  When it comes to obviousness, however, a significant number of invalidations rely
on prior art that would have been difficult or impossible to find at the time of invention.  This
complicates—though does not necessarily refute—the traditional view that obviousness chal-
lenges ought to be proactively encouraged.
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INTRODUCTION
Patent litigation is complicated, fact intensive, and expensive.  Nonethe-
less, for at least fifty years, the Supreme Court has pursued an express policy
of welcoming patent disputes into court and discouraging patent settlement.1
Citing the public’s “paramount interest” in patent adjudication,2 the Court
has abrogated traditional doctrines like licensee estoppel,3 applied non-
mutual claim preclusion to patentees,4 changed the rules of appellate court
procedure,5 and subjected settling patent litigants to potential antitrust liabil-
ity.6  All of this to drum up more patent litigation and guide it toward final
judgment.
Standing alone, this policy is a bit puzzling, occurring as it does within a
court system that typically encourages settlement.7  But the puzzle is only
compounded when one realizes just how exceptional this prolitigation pos-
ture makes patent law.  Among the many kinds of civil cases one might think
serve a public interest—First Amendment litigation, civil rights suits, chal-
lenges to agency actions, and so on—only patent litigation has been anointed
1 See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 851–52
(2014); FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013); Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton
Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 100–01, 101 n.24 (1993); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill.
Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343–44 (1971); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 673–74 (1969).
2 Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 343 (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto.
Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945)).
3 See Lear, 395 U.S. at 670.
4 See Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 343, 350.
5 See Cardinal Chem., 508 U.S. at 100–02.
6 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2232, 2234.
7 See id. at 162 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[The parties’ patent settlement] put an
end to litigation that had been dragging on for three years.  Ordinarily, we would think
this a good thing.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c) advisory committee’s note to 1983
amendment.
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for judicial encouragement.8  What is it that makes patent cases so special,
that they should be encouraged while almost every other type of civil suit is
quietly counseled out of the courtroom?
While the Supreme Court’s answers to that question have been terse,9
scholars have explored the public benefits of patent litigation in some
detail.10  At a high level, there are two distinct theories of how patent litiga-
tion might serve the public interest.  The first is that judicial scrutiny of an
issued patent may end a “patent monopoly,” thereby increasing competition
to the benefit of consumers.11  The second is that revoking an undeserved
patent may send a signal to prospective inventors about the need to comply
8 See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 305 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (“[C]ivil rights litigation is no exception to the general policy in favor of settle-
ments.”); United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 27 (1st Cir. 2001) (observing a “strong public
policy in favor of settlements, particularly in very complex and technical regulatory con-
texts” (quoting United States v. Comunidades Unidas Contra la Contaminacion, 204 F.3d
275, 280 (1st Cir. 2000))); Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 322 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The law favors
settlement, particularly in class actions and other complex cases, to conserve judicial
resources and reduce parties’ costs.”); Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1369
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (“‘[T]here is a compelling public interest and policy in upholding and
enforcing settlement agreements voluntarily entered into’ because enforcement of settle-
ment agreements encourages parties to enter into them—thus fostering judicial economy.”
(quoting Hemstreet v. Spiegel, Inc., 851 F.2d 348, 350 (Fed. Cir. 1988))).
9 Perhaps the most detailed explanation the Court has offered came in 1945, when
the Court explained that because of the “far-reaching social and economic consequences
of a patent,” the public has “a paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies spring
from backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable conduct and that such monopolies
are kept within their legitimate scope.”  Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint.
Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945).  In more recent opinions, the benefits of patent
litigation are simply taken as a given. See, e.g., Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s
Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1374 (2018) (citing “the public’s paramount interest in
seeing that patent monopolies are kept within their legitimate scope” (quoting Cuozzo
Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016)); SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct.
1348, 1363 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same).
10 See, e.g., Michael J. Burstein, Rethinking Standing in Patent Challenges, 83 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 498, 538–41 (2015); Einer Elhauge & Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement
Puzzle, 91 TEX. L. REV. 283, 293–95 (2012); Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to
Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why
Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 945–47 (2004); Jay P.
Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why “Bad” Patents Survive in the Market and How Should We
Change?—The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61, 76–77, 90–92 (2006);
Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 101, 125–27, 179 (2006); Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent
Cases, 101 GEO. L.J. 637, 657 (2013); Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differen-
tial Impact, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 9–11 (2007); R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-
Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2142–45 (2009); Robert C. Dorr, Note, Patent
Law—Patent Validity: The Public Is the Third Party, 51 DENV. L.J. 95, 113 (1974); see also FED.
TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PAT-
ENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 1, at 6, 11, 14 (2003), http://perma.cc/D4DC-WGC7.
11 See Stephen Yelderman, Do Patent Challenges Increase Competition?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV.
1943, 1951–53 (2016) [hereinafter Yelderman, Increasing Competition].
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with the substantive demands of patent law, thereby increasing the incentiviz-
ing power of the patent system in the future.12  Though it is possible for
patent litigation to yield other benefits, these are the two patent-specific theo-
ries that have been most extensively developed and that are consistently
invoked to support policies of encouraging patent litigation.13
But both of these are only theories.  To actually justify our longstanding
policy of encouraging patent litigation, we need to know quite a bit about the
particulars of how patent cases play out in practice.  Under either theory, the
public benefits of patent litigation can turn quite dramatically depending on
the circumstances of a given case.14  For example, it is possible that most
patent cases vindicate the public domain based on prior art that the pur-
ported inventor should have known about.  But it is also possible that many
cases actually involve faultless inventors embroiled in fact-bound disputes
with primarily private significance.  To fully assess the public interest in pat-
ent litigation, we need to know something about the evidence underlying
judicial determinations of invalidity.15
To this point, we have known very little.  While prior studies have
reported the raw number of patents invalidated under various statutory provi-
sions,16 no study has examined the evidence supporting those conclusions.
We know, for example, that among all patent cases filed in 2008 and 2009,
154 summary judgment motions were filed on the basis of anticipation,17 and
that 31 of those motions ultimately succeeded.18  But we have no idea
whether those invalidations involved a strong public interest, or whether they
would be better characterized as private fights over the technicalities of pat-
ent law.19  So while the value of patent litigation has been vigorously theo-
rized, the data necessary to test those theories has so far been lacking.
This Article provides the first comprehensive look at the evidence dis-
trict courts rely upon when invalidating patents.  To construct our dataset, we
collected every district court ruling, verdict form, and opinion (whether
12 See Stephen Yelderman, The Value of Accuracy in the Patent System, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
1217, 1283–84 (2017) [hereinafter Yelderman, Value of Accuracy].
13 In my prior work (and in this Article), I focus on theories that could potentially
justify the patent law exception to the ordinary preference for settlement. See Yelderman,
Increasing Competition, supra note 11, at 1950–51.  I therefore do not consider theories of
benefit that would be shared with other kinds of civil cases—for example, the creation of
precedent. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082–84 (1984).
14 See Yelderman, Increasing Competition, supra note 11, at 1994–95; Yelderman, Value of
Accuracy, supra note 12, at 1283–84.
15 See Yelderman, Value of Accuracy, supra note 12, at 1283–84.
16 See, e.g., John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Understanding the
Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1785 (2014) [hereinafter Allison
et al., Realities of Modern Patent Litigation].
17 Id. at 1770, 1782.  Anticipation (lack of novelty under 35 U.S.C. § 102) is one of two
legal bases requiring evidence of prior art.  35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).  The other is obvi-
ousness, codified in § 103.  35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
18 Allison et al., Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, supra note 16, at 1770, 1785.
19 See infra Section I.B.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-2\NDL207.txt unknown Seq: 5  7-JAN-20 14:54
2019] prior  art  in  the  district  court 841
reported or unreported) invalidating a patent claim over a recent six-and-a-
half-year period.  We then coded individual invalidation events on a refer-
ence-by-reference, claim-by-claim basis.  In the end, we observed 3320 invali-
dation events based on 817 distinct prior art references.
This data sheds critical light on the public value of patent litigation.
And it turns out to reveal starkly different answers depending on the legal
issue in a case.  Invalidations based on anticipation bear many indicia of pub-
licly beneficial error correction.  Encouragingly, invalidity based on obscure
prior art appears to be rare.  This suggests that the bulk of anticipation invali-
dations have the potential to incentivize future inventors.
But the story is not so rosy for cases of obviousness.  A significant num-
ber of obviousness invalidations rely on prior art that would have been diffi-
cult or impossible to find at the time of invention.  This suggests that many
obviousness invalidations lack the potential for incentivization found in cases
of anticipation and may even be disincentivizing for inventors who lose patents
on the basis of facts they simply could not have known.  This does not mean
litigation of these cases is necessarily undesirable—these cases may yet be
justified under some other theory of how patent litigation benefits the pub-
lic.20  But, at a minimum, the data fails to show that the prevailing policy of
encouraging obviousness litigation has a sound empirical basis.
Aside from the public value of patent litigation, this data is relevant to
another set of policy questions as well: whether it would be cost effective to
allocate more time and money to the initial process of patent examination.
For more than a decade, the consensus view—forged by Mark Lemley’s
highly influential article, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office21—has been
that increased investment in patent examination would cost more than it
would save.22  In recent years, scholars have questioned this premise, sug-
gesting that better patent examination could justify its costs by significantly
reducing the need for patent litigation.23  We offer a new perspective on this
debate by assessing the feasibility of patent examiners actually finding the
prior art that later proves fatal in court.  We conclude that Lemley’s original
predictions were implausibly low, but that the latest scholarship rebutting
Lemley’s work appears quite optimistic.  While increased investment in exam-
ination may still turn out to be cost justified, our findings suggest that litiga-
tion savings will not be as large as recent scholarship has predicted.
To be clear from the outset, this is a study of district court litigation as an
error-correction tool, not a study of patent quality.  All of our observations
are drawn from patents that were litigated to a judicial decision, and these
may not be representative of all patents in general or even litigated patents in
general.  Because only a tiny fraction of issued patents are ever asserted, and
only a tiny fraction of those are litigated to a decision, the potential for selec-
20 See infra Section I.A.
21 Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495
(2001).
22 See id. at 1496–97.
23 See infra Part IV.
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tion effects is significant.24  This data sheds light on the nature of the error
correction afforded by district courts and the feasibility of providing that
same error correction through alternative mechanisms, but should not be
used to make any inferences about the nature of patent invalidity overall.
This Article proceeds in five parts.  Part I explains why the public bene-
fits of patent litigation depend on the prior art at issue in a case and briefly
recounts prior studies of district court patent litigation.  Part II introduces
the sources and methodology used in this study.  Part III presents our find-
ings related to the public value of patent litigation.  Part IV explores the like-
lihood that increased investment in examination could avoid the need for
patent adjudication.  Part V discusses several reasons for inferential caution
and suggests avenues for future work.  A brief conclusion follows.
I. BACKGROUND
Before turning to the methodology of this study, two pieces of back-
ground are in order.  Section A explains why the value of patent litigation
can depend on the prior art at issue in a case.  Section B then briefly dis-
cusses several prior studies of district court patent litigation and explains why
they are insufficient to address the questions of interest here.
A. Why the Value of Litigation Depends on Prior Art
Courts and scholars have long heralded the public benefits of patent
litigation.  For nearly a century, the public’s “paramount interest” in ensur-
ing that patents are “free from fraud” and “kept within their legitimate
scope” was accepted as a self-evident proposition that required neither proof
nor elaboration.25  Today, courts, commentators, and litigants often cite the
public benefits of patent litigation as if they were simply an accepted fact.26
24 See infra Section II.B.
25 Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945);
see also Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892); Yelderman, Increasing Competi-
tion, supra note 11, at 1951–58 (collecting similar claims about the public’s interest in pat-
ent litigation).
26 See supra notes 9–10 (collecting court decisions and commentary).  Given the
Supreme Court’s long history of asserting the public interest in patent litigation, it is no
surprise that litigants cite these benefits as well. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae for Sixteen
Intellectual Property Law Professors in Support of the Respondent, Commil USA, LLC v.
Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015) (No. 13-896), 2015 WL 860735, at *8 (arguing that a
particular mens rea rule for secondary liability would “inappropriately discourage[ ] chal-
lenges to patents” (capitalization altered)); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15, Nichia
Corp. v. Everlight Elecs. Co., 139 S. Ct. 183 (2018) (mem.) (No. 17-1707), 2018 WL
3141455 (arguing that patent validity is a question of law because “the proper scope of
patents implicates the public interest” (capitalization altered)); Petition for a Writ of Certi-
orari at i, EVE-USA, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 139 S. Ct. 44 (2018) (mem.) (No. 17-
804), 2017 WL 6018229 (invoking the “important public interest of eliminating invalid
patents” in the Questions Presented).
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It is one thing to tout the benefits of patent litigation; it is another to
propose a defensible theory of how adjudication of patent cases might yield
public benefits not found in other forms of civil litigation.  Prior scholarship
has primarily focused on two distinct theories of how patent cases might
uniquely serve the public interest.  The first theory is that revoking a patent
can reduce or eliminate market power, thereby increasing competition and
freeing the public from the burden of a “patent monopoly.”27  The second
theory is that revoking a patent denies the patent holder the benefit of some-
thing she did not deserve, thus sharpening incentives for inventors to comply
with the substantive demands of patent law in the future.28  The first theory is
about reducing the costs of individual patents; the second is about enforcing
the patent bargain to improve ex ante incentives.
The first theory is important, but it is not the subject of this Article.  As I
have shown in earlier work, the possibility that a patent challenge may
increase competition is highly case specific, depending on factors such as
who wins, how quickly the case is resolved, whether there are other intellec-
tual property rights at play, and other details about the patent in suit and the
structure of the relevant market.29  In some identifiable categories of cases,
the potential benefits for competition can be significant; in others, they can
be quite small.30  The prior art used to invalidate a patent is generally not
relevant to drawing this distinction.  Therefore, this theory will be largely set
aside for purposes of the following discussion, keeping in mind that it may
justify litigation in some cases in which the second theory does not.
Another reason we might want to encourage patent litigation is that
revoking undeserved patents can sharpen incentives for future inventors—
and this theory is the subject of this Article.  As my prior work explores in
detail, the incentivizing power of any promise depends both on the accurate
reward of benefits when they are deserved and on the accurate denial of
those benefits when they are undeserved.31  Revoking an undeserved patent
fulfills the negative promise implicit in the rewards scheme, thus increasing
the power of the offered rewards in the future.32  In this way, successful pat-
ent challenges serve the public interest by denying the benefits of patents to
those who did not hold up their end of the patent bargain.
Like the first, this theory is case specific.  Some patent disputes center on
conduct that the patent system actively seeks to encourage or discourage—
such as a claim that the supposed “inventor” had in fact stolen the invention
from someone else.33  But other patent cases aren’t like that.  Instead, they
are really just fights over technicalities that do not strongly implicate the pat-
27 See Yelderman, Increasing Competition, supra note 11, at 1951–54 (summarizing this
theory).
28 See Yelderman, Value of Accuracy, supra note 12, at 1221, 1221 n.13, 1281–84.
29 See Yelderman, Increasing Competition, supra note 11, at 1960–61.
30 Id. at 1960, 1994–95.
31 See Yelderman, Value of Accuracy, supra note 12, at 1221.
32 Id. at 1247–48.
33 See id. at 1266.
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ent bargain—such as pinning down exactly how difficult it would have been
for a hypothetical researcher to find a particular undergraduate thesis on the
shelf of a university library.34  When an inventor fails to satisfy the patentabil-
ity requirements in a case like that, revoking her patent does not sharpen
incentives to behave differently in the future—she has done everything pat-
ent law demanded of her, yet is denied patent protection all the same.  This
second theory of benefit justifies patent litigation only in cases in which the
inventor faced a mutually exclusive choice and made a decision contrary to
the aims of patent law.35
The power of this incentives-based theory is that it can significantly
reduce the potential range of optimal-error rates in the patent system.  With
some basic assumptions about the observability of errors, the incentives-based
theory can show that patents should be awarded only when there is at least a
fifty percent chance that they are actually deserved.36  This, in turn, provides
qualified support for longstanding policies designed to increase rates of pat-
ent adjudication.37  But there is a limit.  When a patent is revoked for reasons
beyond the inventor’s control, the inventor faces no relevant mutually exclu-
sive choice, and the inventor-incentivizing benefit is unavailable.  In those
cases, revoking an invalid patent may actually be disincentivizing, since it
reduces the correlation between conduct and outcome, thereby weakening
the power of the patent promise.  This does not mean these cases necessarily
lack value—in fact, they may still be justified on some other grounds.  But as
far as the inventor-incentivizing theory goes, the benefits of adjudication are
limited to cases in which inventors lose patent rights as a result of things they
could have plausibly controlled.38
Litigation involving some patentability doctrines will reliably satisfy this
condition.  For example, the enablement requirement is specifically
designed to coerce patent applicants to teach the public how to use the
invention.39  When an applicant fails to sufficiently disclose an invention and
her patent is consequently taken away, the fault is entirely her own.  No
extrinsic factors or moral luck intercedes between the conduct patent law
seeks to influence and the outcome patent law provides.  Provided they are
observable, these are reliably inventor-incentivizing error corrections.
For other patentability doctrines, however, the path from conduct to
outcome is more roundabout.  In particular, when a patent is revoked
because it was anticipated or obvious in light of prior art, the inventor’s cul-
pability in having originally sought that patent turns significantly on the
34 See In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
35 See Yelderman, Value of Accuracy, supra note 12, at 1242–43.
36 See id. at 1251–56.
37 See id. at 1281–83.
38 Cf. Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 307, 313–14, 332 (1994) (observing that greater accuracy in adjudication can
be a waste of resources if actors lack the same information at the moment of their
decisionmaking).
39 See Yelderman, Value of Accuracy, supra note 12, at 1263–65.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-2\NDL207.txt unknown Seq: 9  7-JAN-20 14:54
2019] prior  art  in  the  district  court 845
nature of the prior art itself.40  These two patentability doctrines constitute
the majority of all postgrant patent revocations.41  And yet it is impossible to
say whether these revocations are inventor-incentivizing without knowing
something about the prior art underlying that decision.
To see why, consider the anticipation doctrine (sometimes called the
“novelty” requirement).42  A patent claim is anticipated only when all of the
elements of the claim can be found in a single prior art reference.  Critically,
a factfinder may not combine multiple references to establish anticipation.43
For that reason, the anticipation inquiry is quite straightforward.  The
factfinder simply compares the prior art to the patent claim to see if there is a
match.44
The value of commissioning that comparison depends greatly on what,
exactly, we are asking the factfinder to compare the claim to.  For example, a
patent can be anticipated because the inventor published her idea long
before patenting, sat on the sideline for years, and then sought patent protec-
tion only after the idea caught on.  This behavior creates serious hold-up
problems for the public and is something patent law very much seeks to dis-
courage.45  Catching such cases, therefore, is a strongly incentivizing form of
error correction.  In addition, even in cases in which the inventor did not
actually know about the prior art at the time, denying patent protection
based on reasonably discoverable prior art encourages future inventors to
seek out existing solutions before wastefully reinventing the wheel.46  So
when the inventor could have discovered the anticipating prior art with a
reasonable amount of searching, revoking her patent is also a strongly incen-
tivizing form of error correction.
40 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
41 Historically, anticipation and obviousness comprised the vast majority of patent-
level invalidity events in district court. See Allison et al., Realities of Modern Patent Litigation,
supra note 16, at 1782; infra Section IV.A.  The number of district court invalidations based
on prior art has declined in recent years, but this reduction has been more than offset by
the introduction of inter partes review. See infra Part V.
42 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).  Note that § 102 was reorganized and substantively
changed in several ways by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29,
125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012)).  Unless otherwise noted, refer-
ences to § 102 refer to the pre-AIA version of the statute, which was the applicable law for
ninety-nine percent of the invalidations in our dataset.  The possibility that district courts
may use prior art differently when applying post-AIA law is addressed in Section V.C.
43 See Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
44 See id. To be sure, in ways that are not relevant here, this seemingly simple compari-
son can become more complicated.  For example, the court may need to first determine
what the challenged claim means, whether the asserted prior art reference has any undis-
closed but “inherent” features, see id. at 1346–47 (discussing claim construction and inher-
ency), and whether the asserted prior art reference is enabled, see Rasmusson v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 413 F.3d 1318, 1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (discussing
enablement).
45 See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63–65 (1998).
46 See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY
401–02 (6th ed. 2013); Yelderman, Value of Accuracy, supra note 12, at 1267–68.
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But anticipation can also rely on obscure prior art, things which the
inventor did not know about and could not possibly have found—such as an
unpublished illustration discoverable only by travelling in person to the
Canadian patent office.47  Invalidations like these are not an incentivizing
form of error correction; the inventor cannot seriously be blamed for failing
to travel to every patent office in the world.  When the only reason a patent is
invalid is that obscure prior art anticipated the invention, the inventor is per-
haps unlucky, but has done nothing that patent law affirmatively seeks to
discourage.48  The difference between valuable enforcement of the patent
bargain and a defendant escaping on a technicality depends on the availabil-
ity of the anticipating prior art.
The other way that prior art can invalidate a claim is through the obvi-
ousness doctrine.  Even in cases in which the claimed invention is not antici-
pated, it may be invalid “if the differences between the claimed invention and
the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been
obvious.”49  As the Supreme Court has explained, “The nonobviousness
requirement extends the field of unpatentable material beyond that which is
[anticipated], to include that which could readily be deduced from publicly
available material by a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent field of
endeavor.”50
In contrast to the rigid rules of anticipation, the obviousness determina-
tion requires an “expansive and flexible approach.”51  Its primary advantage,
from a challenger’s perspective, is that multiple prior art references may be
relied upon to support the conclusion that the claim is invalid.52  Thus even
if the claimed invention cannot be found in any single prior art reference,
the claim may still be invalid because it would have been obvious in light of
all the prior art that existed at the time of the invention.53
As with cases of anticipation, the incentivizing effect of enforcing the
obviousness doctrine depends greatly on the prior art behind the legal con-
clusion.  In some cases, obviousness may be a tool for handling near-miss
cases of anticipation, causing the value of enforcing both doctrines to closely
track each other.  For example, filing a claim on a trivial derivative of some-
thing that has long been in the public domain should be discouraged for the
same reason that filing a claim on exactly what has long been in the public
domain should be discouraged: the inventor should have known that the
invention was already available to the public and not wasted everyone’s time
47 See Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 453 F.3d 1352, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(Newman, J., dissenting from denial of the petition for rehearing en banc).
48 See Yelderman, Value of Accuracy, supra note 12, at 1272–76.
49 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
50 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989).
51 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007).
52 See id. at 417.
53 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).  Under the AIA, the ques-
tion is whether it would have been obvious at the time of filing, not invention. See 35
U.S.C. § 103.
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by seeking patent protection for it.54  Likewise, seeking subsequent protec-
tion for simplistic variants of one’s own prior inventions (also known as “pat-
ent evergreening”) is a wasteful, unproductive activity that patent law seeks to
discourage.55
But obviousness also extends to combinations of things that fall well
beyond widespread knowledge or the inventor’s own prior work.  All of the
obscure or secret references that qualify as prior art for purposes of anticipa-
tion qualify as prior art for purposes of obviousness, too.56  And the risk of
nonincentivizing error correction is even greater when an obscure reference
is the basis for obviousness.  For example, if there is little incentivizing bene-
fit in revoking a patent solely on account of an unpublished piece of paper
sitting in Canada,57 the benefit is even smaller when it comes to revoking a
patent because that Canadian document could have been combined with
some other information found in a different (perhaps equally obscure) loca-
tion.58  So as with anticipation, the incentivizing power of revoking an obvi-
ous patent depends on the availability of the prior art that renders the patent
obvious.59
As a result, the nature of the prior art invalidating patents in district
court can shed light on the public benefits of patent litigation. But to be
clear, our ability to reach firm conclusions will be asymmetric depending on
what the district court evidence reveals. When a district court invalidates a
patent based on prior art that was widely known and easily accessible, we can
identify that as an inventor-incentivizing form of error correction. But the
contrapositive does not hold. When a district court invalidates a patent based
on obscure prior art, we cannot rule out the possibility that the same infor-
mation may have been contained in other, more widely disseminated
54 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Anticipation and Obviousness as Possession, 65 EMORY
L.J. 987, 1027–29 (2016).
55 See Dmitry Karshtedt, The More Things Change: Improvement Patents, Drug Modifica-
tions, and the FDA, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1129, 1141 n.64, 1159–63 (2019).
56 See Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252, 252–54, 256 (1965).
57 See Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 453 F.3d 1352, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(Newman, J., dissenting from denial of the petition for rehearing en banc).
58 As others have noted, the doctrine’s “person of ordinary skill” comes programmed
with a superhuman amount of knowledge, which can result in an unrealistic standard of
invention when obscure prior art is at issue. See Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A
Realistic Approach to the Obviousness of Inventions, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 1001, 1016
(2008); Michael Ebert, Superperson and the Prior Art, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 657,
657–59 (1985).
59 To be clear, the fact that expansive prior art rules sometimes cause inventors to lose
patents for reasons beyond their control does not mean the rules themselves are substan-
tively flawed.  Even when prior art is obscure, it may be that the costs of conferring exclu-
sive rights are unjustified in light of that prior art.  Indeed, entire patentability doctrines
may be justified out of concerns for ex post costs.  For example, the Supreme Court has
rooted the patentable subject matter requirement exclusively in concerns about costs; revo-
cations on these grounds are not intended to discourage future inventors from exploring
abstract ideas or natural phenomena.  Yelderman, Value of Accuracy, supra note 12, at
1270–72.
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sources. In such a case, we can observe that the invalidation lacks the indicia
of inventor-incentivizing error correction, but we cannot necessarily con-
clude that the invalidation has no inventor-incentivizing effect at all.
Moreover, we must also remember that we are only exploring one way
that patent litigation can benefit the public. Even cases that demonstrably
provide no inventor-incentivizing error correction could provide other kinds
of public benefits.  So even if we could show that certain kinds of litigation
have no inventor-incentivizing effect at all, that would not necessarily mean
that current policies to encourage patent challenges are misguided. It would
only mean that this particular theory cannot do all the work.
B. Prior Work
Courts and commentators today have the benefit of a large body of
empirical patent scholarship on which to draw.  No prior study, however, has
examined the work of district courts at the level of detail necessary to answer
the questions introduced above.60
The vast majority of prior studies of patent cases have focused on court
outcomes without reporting the factual bases for those decisions.  A pair of
recent articles by John Allison, Mark Lemley, and David Schwartz illustrate
the current state of the art.  Allison and his coauthors collected all patent
cases filed between 2008 and 2009 that resulted in a substantive decision and
coded those outcomes on a number of metrics, including the statutory provi-
sion that served as the basis for any invalidity decisions.61  They did not, how-
ever, report any information about the prior art supporting those decisions.
As a result, one can learn how many patents were invalidated in reliance on
prior art during their study period—seventy-two were anticipated and sev-
enty-two were held to be obvious—but one cannot glean anything about the
sources of the prior art the court relied on to reach those conclusions.62
Earlier work by two of those coauthors did shed a bit more light on the
prior art relied upon in district court, though, again, with insufficient detail
60 For an excellent synopsis of prior empirical studies in this area, see Ronald Mann &
Christopher Cotropia, Empirical Studies in Patentability, in 2 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 281 (Peter S. Menell & David L. Schwartz eds.,
2019).
61 See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Our Divided Patent System,
82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1080, 1083 (2015) [hereinafter Allison et al., Divided Patent System];
Allison et al., Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, supra note 16, at 1773, 1775–76.
62 See Allison et al., Divided Patent System, supra note 61, at 1104–05.  A 2015 paper by
Shine Tu likewise reports the legal basis for approximately 600 patent invalidations occur-
ring in cases that terminated between 2010 and 2012.  Shine Tu, Invalidated Patents and
Associated Patent Examiners, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 135, 143–44, 160 (2015).  Along
similar lines, a 2015 paper by Michael Risch provides data on the legal basis for invalidity
for 73 litigated patents.  Michael Risch, A Generation of Patent Litigation, 52 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 67, 114 tbl.13 (2015).  For invalidation based on § 102(b), Risch does break out activ-
ity prior art versus printed publications. Id. However, the number of observations is very
small—only 19 patent-level invalidity events—and this breakdown is not provided for other
statutory provisions. Id.
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to answer the questions of present interest.  A 1998 paper by Allison and
Lemley collected all final written validity decisions reported in U.S. Patent
Quarterly between 1989 and 1996, obtaining data relating to 138 patents
invalidated during their study period.63  Although Allison and Lemley did
not describe the sources of the prior art in detail,64 they did observe whether
the invalidation was made “primarily” based on art that had been at the
examination stage.65  With weak statistical confidence, they reported that
prior art that had not been cited in examination was more likely to invalidate
a patent than prior art that had been cited.66  Along similar lines, a now-
quite-dated study by Gloria Koenig sampled 150 patent invalidity decisions
from 1953 to 1967 and reported the percentage of those decisions that relied
on any uncited prior art.67
Other studies have also examined the legal basis for patent invalidity
determinations.  For example, a 2012 paper by Ronald Mann and Marian
Underweiser collected Federal Circuit patent validity decisions handed down
from 2003 to 2009 and coded them based on whether the issue was one of
prior art, patent drafting (such as lack of enablement or definiteness),68 or
prior use.69  Similarly, in a 1995 article, Donald Dunner, J. Michael Jakes,
and Jeffrey Karceski collected Federal Circuit validity decisions from 1982 to
1994 and reported their disposition by legal bases, though they did not
explore the prior art that led to those decisions.70  Another set of studies
reported litigation success rates for patent holders but did not report even
the legal basis for invalidity determinations, much less the prior art at issue.71
63 John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Pat-
ents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 187, 205 (1998).
64 Allison and Lemley did break out § 102 invalidations into two subcategories.  They
found that approximately 46% of § 102 invalidations were based on “true” prior art, while
approximately 54% of § 102 invalidations involved the inventor’s forfeiting patentability
through his own actions (often called statutory bars), abandoning the invention § 102(c),
deriving the invention from another under § 102(f), or losing a priority dispute under
§ 102(g). Id. at 199 n.39, 208.  This classification provides a bit more information about
the underlying invalidity decision, but still does not reveal what the invalidating prior art
actually was.
65 See id. at 229–33.
66 Id. at 233–34.
67 See GLORIA K. KOENIG, PATENT INVALIDITY 5-2, 5-48 (rev. ed. 1980).
68 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
69 Ronald J. Mann & Marian Underweiser, A New Look at Patent Quality: Relating Patent
Prosecution to Validity, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 7 (2012).  Unfortunately for present
purposes, the authors did not report the number of patents invalidated based on prior art
versus prior use.
70 Donald R. Dunner, J. Michael Jakes & Jeffrey D. Karceski, A Statistical Look at the
Federal Circuit’s Patent Decisions: 1982–1994, 5 FED. CIR. B.J. 151, 153, 158 (1995).
71 See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empiri-
cal Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH U. L. REV. 237,
276 tbl.8 (2006) (reporting 118 invalidity events for all patent cases filed in 1995, 1997, and
2000, but without disclosing legal basis or prior art); Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of
the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 418–21 (1994) (reporting success rates of
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A number of papers have focused on the obviousness inquiry in particu-
lar, usually with an interest in exploring whether and how the obviousness
standard may have changed over time.  For example, a 2006 paper by Sean
McEldowney collected published district court opinions from 1970 through
1975 and 1995 through 2000 to assess whether obviousness challenges had
become more or less likely to succeed after the creation after the creation of
the Federal Circuit.72  Along similar lines, a 2001 paper by Glynn Lunney
collected appellate opinions from various time periods over a fifty-year span
to measure shifts in the frequency of obviousness-based invalidity.73  Another
series of papers have investigated how the Federal Circuit’s approach to obvi-
ousness has changed after the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR International
Co. v. Teleflex Inc.74  All of these studies were focused on the outcome or
methodology of the obviousness determination; none of them explored the
prior art underlying that determination.75
In sum, then, prior work provides some reference points about the num-
ber of patents invalidated each year and the percentage of challenges that
patent challenges); Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic
Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 918–19 (2001) (evaluating success rate of
challenges to patent validity based on judicial district); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries,
and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 390–92 (2000)
(reporting similar statistics, evaluated based on factfinder rather than venue).  For a much
older study of the legal bases of patent invalidity, see P.J. Federico, Adjudicated Patents,
1948–54, 38 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 233 (1956).
72 Sean M. McEldowney, Note, New Insights on the “Death” of Obviousness: An Empirical
Study of District Court Obviousness Opinions, 2006 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4, ¶¶ 22, 29–34.
73 Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363, 370–75
(2001).
74 550 U.S. 398 (2007); see Ali Mojibi, An Empirical Study of the Effect of KSR v. Teleflex
on the Federal Circuit’s Patent Validity Jurisprudence, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 559, 561 (2010);
Jennifer Nock & Sreekar Gadde, Raising the Bar for Nonobviousness: An Empirical Study of
Federal Circuit Case Law Following KSR, 20 FED. CIR. B.J. 369, 371 (2011); Jason Rantanen,
The Federal Circuit’s New Obviousness Jurisprudence: An Empirical Study, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
709, 711 (2013); see also Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit: An
Empirical Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 913–14, 927 (2007) (stud-
ying how the Federal Circuit approached obviousness in the years prior to KSR); Lee
Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical Assessment
of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051, 2071–72 (2007) (same).  For other studies of
obviousness outcomes in various tribunals, see Gregory N. Mandel, A Nonobvious Compari-
son: Nonobviousness Decisions at the PTAB and in the Federal Courts, 24 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
403 (2016).
75 Several of the papers cited above hint at steps taken to collect or code information
about cited prior art. See Allison et al., Divided Patent System, supra note 61, at 1083 (“We
also coded various bases for § 102 invalidity.”); Allison et al., Realities of Modern Patent Litiga-
tion, supra note 16, at 1776 (“We also coded various bases for section 102 invalidity.”); Nock
& Gadde, supra note 74, at 389 (“If prior art was discussed, the type of prior art was coded
as patents, non-patent publications, witness testimony, or products.”); Petherbridge & Wag-
ner, supra note 74, at 2073.  Unfortunately, none of these studies report the results of this
coding.
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were successful.  But no prior study has provided a comprehensive picture of
the prior art underlying those district court decisions.76
II. METHODOLOGY
To shed light on the questions set forth above, we undertook a straight-
forward but substantial task: examining every district court patent decision
over a six-and-a-half-year period and identifying the prior art underlying each
invalidity determination.  Section A describes our methodology for collecting
and coding these documents.  Section B then addresses several potential
questions about reproducibility and selection effects.
A. Collection and Coding
Collecting and analyzing invalidity in the district court involved three
basic steps.  First, we collected the primary source documents (court opin-
ions and verdict forms) in which invalidity occurred.  Second, we reviewed
these documents to determine the legal basis and prior art supporting the
court’s decision.  Third, we gathered contextualizing information about the
case, patent, and cited prior art from a number of secondary sources.
To obtain all district court invalidity rulings that occurred during the
study period, we ran a special query search on Docket Navigator77 for every
determination of invalidity between January 1, 2011, and June 30, 2017.78
This initial query returned 2601 documents.  We then reviewed each of these
documents to determine whether it was (1) a district court79 opinion or jury
verdict; (2) in which one or more claims of a utility patent were determined
to be invalid; and (3) not identical to another document we had already col-
lected.  Applying these criteria produced a set of 820 opinions and 85 jury
verdicts, for a total of 905 documents.
For each document in this set, we captured basic caption information
and coded the legal determinations of invalidity contained in that document.
For all bases of invalidity, we recorded the legal grounds and patent number
76 By contrast, several papers have explored the nature of the prior art used in exami-
nation. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Do Applicant
Patent Citations Matter?, 42 RES. POL’Y 844, 844 (2013); Dennis D. Crouch, Is Novelty Obso-
lete? Chronicling the Irrelevance of the Invention Date in U.S. Patent Law, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 53, 66 (2009).
77 Docket Navigator is a commercial database service that has collected every deci-
sional document directly from district court dockets for certain categories of cases, includ-
ing patent cases. See DOCKET NAVIGATOR, http://brochure.docketnavigator.com/ (last
visited Oct. 21, 2019).  The company offers no-cost subscriptions to academic researchers
and very graciously assisted the current projected by answering many questions.
78 We selected this particular study period to obtain the most recent data possible,
while also ensuring we had several hundred invalidations on both anticipation and obvi-
ousness grounds.
79 At this step we included all opinions by magistrate judges and special masters.  We
also included decisions in the Court of Federal Claims as if it were a federal district court.
We excluded decisions by the International Trade Commission.
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of the affected patent.  When a patent was invalidated for anticipation or
obviousness, we also coded the court’s conclusions at a claim level, identify-
ing the reference (or references) supporting the invalidity decision.  Redun-
dant rationales for claim invalidity were coded as distinct invalidity events.
For example, if the court found the same claim both anticipated and obvious,
we recorded one observation for the anticipation conclusion and another
observation for the obviousness conclusion.  Likewise, if the court found the
same claim anticipated by two distinct references, we recorded one observa-
tion for anticipation based on the first reference and another observation for
anticipation based on the second reference.  We recorded only conclusions
that a claim was invalid; there are no failed validity challenges in our dataset.
For judicial decisions of invalidity (motions to dismiss, summary judg-
ment, judgment as a matter of law, and bench trials), this coding process was
straightforward.  Jury verdicts were a bit more complicated, since verdict
forms do not always interrogate the factual basis for the jury’s conclusions.
We addressed this potential ambiguity by first coding all the information that
we could glean from the jury verdict form itself and then consulting the post-
trial docket and appellate filings to fill in as much additional information as
possible.  In many cases, a later ruling by the judge denying judgment as a
matter of law clearly identified the prior art that (in the judge’s view) pro-
vided an adequate evidentiary basis for the jury’s finding.  If we could not
unambiguously discern the jury’s legal conclusions, we coded the cited prior
art (and sometimes, legal basis) as “unknown.”  In a few cases, the verdict
form or posttrial activity made it clear that the basis for the decision was
either anticipation or obviousness but did not unambiguously specify which.
In these cases, we coded the legal basis as “102 or 103 (unknown).”
After using this procedure to code all the documents in the set, we then
checked for redundancy across the docket of a particular case.  Because a
court will sometimes make multiple decisions that effectively affirm the same
result, it was possible that the same invalidity event could have been redun-
dantly coded.  For example, when a magistrate judge recommended granting
summary judgment and the district judge adopted that recommendation,
our initial coding would have recorded the same ruling twice: first based on
the magistrate’s recommendation, and then a second time based on the dis-
trict judge’s adoption of that recommendation.  At the level of the court’s
docket these might appear to be multiple invalidations, but they are not
legally distinct invalidation events.
To avoid this potential double counting, we identified cases with multi-
ple coded documents and checked for decision-level redundancy.  When we
found decision-level redundancy—defined as the same substantive ruling
being captured in multiple documents—we dropped the redundant observa-
tions, keeping only one observation of that ruling using an “earliest undis-
turbed decision” rule.  For example, if the district court judge adopted a
magistrate’s invalidity ruling in full, we dropped the district judge’s opinion
and preserved the magistrate opinion as the earliest undisturbed ruling.
However, if the district judge modified the magistrate judge’s invalidity rul-
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ing in some way, rejecting the earlier ruling or adopting it only in part, the
district judge’s opinion became the operative observation and the magistrate
opinion was dropped.  We applied the same rule for motions for reconsidera-
tion, amended opinions, and corrected jury verdict forms.80  Our coding was
based exclusively on the decisions of district courts; we did not observe the
outcomes of appeals.81
After collecting, coding, and dropping redundant observations in the
manner described above, our dataset contained 1542 patent-level invalidity
events.82  The legal bases and procedural postures of these patent-level inva-
lidity events broke down as follows:
80 To be clear, we applied this “earliest undisturbed decision” rule only at the level of
the district court docket—we did not drop or replace district court decisions based on the
results of appeal.  As a result, if a district court invalidated a claim, the Federal Circuit
reversed and remanded, and the district court invalidated that claim again, both district
court decisions would appear in the dataset.  We observed this on fewer than five
occasions.
81 As a result, it is likely that at least a few of the invalidations in our dataset were later
reversed on appeal.  Conversely, there are likely some cases in which the district court did
not find a particular claim invalid, but the Federal Circuit did so on appeal.  These invali-
dations events would be absent from our dataset.  Finally, there may have been some cases
in which the district court found a claim invalid based on one legal basis/reference and
the Federal Circuit affirmed on a different legal basis (or reference).  In these cases, our
data would reflect the legal basis/reference combination relied upon by the district court.
We chose to focus on the work of the district court because (a) doing so permits us to study
more recent invalidation events (appeals and retrials can drag on for years), and (b) a
district court determination of invalidity is often a legally and economically significant
event in its own right, even if it is later reversed or modified on appeal.  We cannot predict
how our results would change if instead of focusing on district courts we traced the path of
patents up and down through appeals.
82 Each patent-level invalidity event represents a unique combination of decisional
document, patent, and legal basis.  Thus, the same patent experiencing invalidity on the
same legal basis in two different court documents would correspond to two distinct invalid-
ity events.  Likewise, the same patent experiencing invalidity on two different legal bases in
a single court document would correspond to two distinct invalidity events.
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TABLE 1: PATENT-LEVEL INVALIDITY EVENTS, BY LEGAL BASIS AND POSTURE
Summary
Posture / Pleading J. / Jury Bench
Legal Basis Stage Markman Verdict Trial Posttrial Total
§ 101 360 147 1 0 1 509
Anticipation 0 138 73 12 7 230
Obviousness 0 95 85 56 13 249
Anticipation or
Obviousness 0 0 12 0 0
(indeterminate) 12
Indefinite 3 344 0 8 2 357
Enablement 0 28 7 6 2 43
Written
0 42 12 4 1
Description 59
Unknown 0 0 8 0 0 8
Other 5 48 12 9 1 75*
Total 368 842 210 95 27 1542
Note: *The legal bases of the 75 “other” patent-level invalidity events consist of issue
preclusion / estoppel (24); improper inventorship / 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (2006) (17);
impermissible rebroadening under 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2012) or 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2012) (8);
nonstatutory double-patenting (7); lack of utility (6); failure to disclose best mode (5);
inequitable conduct (4); failure to otherwise comply with 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) (4).
To be clear, some patents were invalidated on multiple grounds or in
multiple decisional documents.  These 1542 patent-level invalidity events
involved 1273 distinct patents.  Overwhelmingly, the redundancy came from
multiple invalidations of a patent within the same court.  Only 26 patents
experienced invalidity in multiple courts during the study period.83
For the 499 of these patent-level invalidity events based on anticipation,
obviousness, or an unknown legal basis, we also coded at the level of individ-
ual claims.  These yielded 3320 claim-level invalidity events affecting 390 dis-
tinct patents.84  We were able to determine the prior art relied upon for 91%
of these invalidations, resulting in 3036 claim-level invalidity events based on
817 distinct, identifiable prior art references.
The final step of our coding process was to gather contextualizing infor-
mation about the patents, cases, and prior art references from a number of
secondary sources.  Some of this additional research was necessary to fill in
information that would normally be expected in the court’s opinion but that
was missing in individual cases.  For example, in some instances, it was not
possible to unambiguously identify a patent number, claim number, or prior
83 Among these, only two patents were invalidated on prior art grounds by multiple
district courts—and in these instances each court invalidated a different set of claims.
84 Each claim-level invalidity event represents a unique combination of decisional doc-
ument, patent, claim, legal basis, and prior art reference set.
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art reference from the face of the primary document alone.85  When this
occurred, we variously referred to party briefs, pretrial orders, and final judg-
ments to disambiguate the verdict or opinion.  On a few occasions, pulling
these supplementary court documents revealed apparent errors in the origi-
nal opinion we coded—such as flipped digits in a patent number or misspell-
ing of a reference name.  Resolving these conflicts required further
investigation of the court’s docket entries.
Other supplementary research tasks drew from a number of secondary
sources.  For example, we consulted U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) databases to collect a number of data points relating to filing date,
prosecution history, and priority claims.86  We also consulted another com-
mercial database service, Lex Machina,87 to collect additional information
about the litigation that gave rise to the court opinion or verdict.
B. Reproducibility and Selection Effects
Though time intensive, the methodology described above is highly
reproducible.  With one exception discussed below, all of the coding and
collection steps can be fairly described as rote data entry based on publicly
available sources.
Our choice to code invalidity events at the level of individual claims is an
essential feature in this regard.  Because a single opinion may reach different
conclusions for different claims, or invalidate the same claim for multiple
reasons, coding at a higher level of granularity would necessarily require sub-
jective judgments about which aspects of the court’s opinion were the most
85 For example, short opinions and jury verdicts often refer to prior art references
only by the author’s name (“the Smith reference”) and refer to litigated patents only by
the last three digits of their patent number (“the 091 Patent”).
86 In particular, at various steps of this project we employed the PTO’s Public Pair
Research Dataset, the PTO’s Assignment Database, and the PTO’s Historical Patent Data
Files. Electronic Patent Application Submission and Retrieval, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/newsletter/inventors-eye/electronic-pat
ent-application-submission-and (last visited Oct. 27, 2019); Historical Patent Data Files, U.S.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/electronic-data-
products/historical-patent-data-files (last visited Oct. 27, 2019); Patent Assignment Search,
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://assignment.uspto.gov/patent/index.html#/patent/
search (last visited Oct. 27, 2019). See generally Stuart Graham et al., The USPTO Patent
Examination Research Dataset: A Window on the Process of Patent Examination (U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, Economic Working Paper No. 2015-4, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract
=2702637 (describing the Patent Examination Research Dataset from PAIR); Alan C.
Marco et al., The USPTO Historical Patent Data Files: Two Centuries of Innovation (U.S. Patent
& Trademark Office, Economic Working Paper No. 2015-1, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abs
tract=2616724 (describing the Historical Patent Files).
87 LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).  Lex Machina
also graciously provided no-cost subscriptions to support our work.
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significant.88  We avoided making subjective judgments by simply coding
everything.
The one aspect of our coding process that sometimes involved a mea-
sure of interpretive judgment was the step of identifying the prior art relied
upon to find a claim obvious.  Obviousness is a complex, multifactored deter-
mination, and sometimes turns on evidence that is not, strictly speaking,
prior art at all.89  In coding obviousness determinations, we attempted to
identify the prior art references that were explicitly relied upon to form the
prima facie case of obviousness and to exclude references cited only for tech-
nical background, motivation to combine, or secondary considerations of
nonobviousness.90
Many court documents clearly identified the specific prior art references
that formed the basis for concluding that a claim was obvious.91  In these
cases, coding the prior art relied upon for obviousness was a straightforward
process of data entry, much like the other aspects of our coding as described
above.  But there were also cases in which the court’s obviousness discussion
was surprisingly opaque, making it difficult to discern which prior art refer-
ences had been relied upon to invalidate exactly which claims.  In these
cases, mapping prior art to claims sometimes required a few judgment calls.
To test the reproducibility of our obviousness coding, we asked an exper-
ienced patent attorney with no other connection to this project to indepen-
dently code a subset of the obviousness events.  Her interpretation of the
claims that had been held obvious was consistent with our initial coding in
99% of claim-level obviousness events, and her interpretation of the prior art
relied upon to support those invalidations was consistent with our initial cod-
ing in 91% of claim-level obviousness events.92  Within the 9% of claim-level
obviousness events in which our interpretations differed, there were some
cases in which both coders agreed about the prior art references supporting
obviousness at a patent level but had simply mapped those references to
claims in a slightly different manner.  In these cases, our differing interpreta-
tion of the source opinion would have a subtle effect on the weighting of
certain pieces of prior art but would not bring in (or exclude) actually differ-
88 Cf. Allison & Lemley, supra note 63, at 232 n.87 (describing “difficult judgment[s]”
in determining which references were “primarily” relied upon by the courts).
89 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
90 See id. (distinguishing these steps).
91 The familiar form of this statement goes something like, “For the reasons stated
above, it would have been obvious to combine Reference A with Reference B in light of
Reference C to arrive at the invention of Claim 1.”
92 Specifically, we used a random number generator to draw twenty court opinions
that we had previously coded as containing one or more obviousness invalidity events and
asked the secondary coder to indicate which references the court had relied upon to invali-
date each claim.  Of the 180 claim-level obviousness events in those opinions, the primary
and secondary coder identified the same set of references in 164 of them.  The primary
coder identified one or more references not identified by the secondary coder for 12
claim-level invalidity events.  In the opposite direction, the secondary coder identified one
or more references not identified by the primary coder for 4 claim-level invalidity events.
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ent references.93  Ultimately, we cannot say for sure whether the need to
interpret some obviousness opinions may have biased our results, and, if so,
in which direction that bias would have pointed.  However, the high percent-
age of agreement between coders suggests that the magnitude of any bias
would be small.
Finally, a quick word about selection effects.  Our population of interest
is district court decisions, which we have observed directly from the underly-
ing court documents.  This dataset allows us to report a number of things
about how and why patents are invalidated in district court.  It does not, how-
ever, permit us to make inferences about patent quality more generally.
Only a very small fraction of issued patents are ever asserted in court, and, of
those, only a very small fraction are litigated to the point of a validity determi-
nation.  And the decisions to assert, settle, or litigate might well turn on the
variables of interest to our study.
To illustrate, suppose that a very small percentage of our observed dis-
trict court invalidations rely on foreign patents.  From this fact, it may be
tempting to conclude that very few of the millions of U.S. patents in circula-
tion are invalid based on foreign patents and perhaps even to discourage the
PTO from searching foreign patents.94  This inference, however, would be
unsupported.  It could be the case that millions of U.S. patents are invalid as
a result of foreign patents but that litigants typically settle these cases before
the court can reach a decision on the merits.  Or, conversely, it is possible
that litigants never settle such cases.  Observed litigation outcomes could
either understate or overstate the importance of a prior art category in terms
of patent quality overall.  Therefore, this data should only be used to answer
questions about why patents are invalidated in district court, not why patents
might be invalid in general.
Note, however, that for purposes of assessing the public benefits of pat-
ent litigation, these selection effects are a feature, not a bug.  In fact, they are
the point.  If litigants typically settle cases involving a particular kind of prior
art, that tendency directly affects the value of the cases that are litigated to a
decision and should be taken into account when measuring the benefits of
encouraging patent cases.  And if by chance there are no selection effects—if
patents reaching a reasoned decision are representative of patents overall—
then the same point stands.  Understanding the factual bases of these deci-
sions directly informs whether the cost of that error correction was worth the
investment.
93 Generally speaking, more sophisticated metrics for measuring intercoder reliability
(such as Cohen’s kappa coefficient) are preferable to percentage of agreement, because
they take into account the possibility of agreement occurring by chance.  However, these
metrics are inappropriate for the coding at issue here, since the set of potential responses
is open ended.
94 See Dennis Crouch, How Many US Patents Are In-Force?, PATENTLY-O (May 4, 2012),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/05/how-many-us-patents-are-in-force.html (estimat-
ing, in 2012, that 2.1 million U.S. patents were currently in force).
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III. PRIOR ART IN THE DISTRICT COURT
There are three basic facts relevant to the value of the error correction
provided by district courts.  First, are courts invalidating claims based on
anticipation or obviousness?  Second, how obscure is the prior art that pro-
vides the basis for the invalidity ruling?  Third, was there some relationship
between one of the parties and the invalidating prior art at issue?
This Part reports the results of our study with an eye to answering these
questions.
A. Anticipation vs. Obviousness
Based on the differences between the anticipation and obviousness
inquiries, one might expect obviousness to dominate the work of district
courts.  Obviousness is a complex question of law, one that is generally
thought to be less predictable.  Anticipation, on the other hand, is usually
regarded as a straightforward factual determination.  Because parties are
more likely to settle cases with clearer outcomes and to litigate cases with less
predictable outcomes,95 one might predict obviousness to represent an out-
size portion of the work of district courts in patent cases.
This prediction would be wrong.  Over the course of the study period,
the number of claims invalidated on anticipation grounds (1636) almost
exactly equaled the number of claims invalidated on obviousness grounds
(1620).96  Moreover, the relationship between anticipation and obviousness
appeared stable throughout the study period:
95 See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
96 In addition, 19 claims were held invalid on legal grounds that were not stated by the
court.  Another 45 claims were invalidated either for anticipation or obviousness, though
we could not conclusively determine which argument carried the day.  These 2% of claims
with an ambiguous legal basis are excluded in the following discussion.
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FIGURE 1: RATIO OF ANTICIPATION EVENTS TO OBVIOUSNESS EVENTS
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Figure 1 illustrates the ratio of anticipation events to obviousness
events—a result above 1 means anticipation events dominated obviousness
events, while a result below 1 means obviousness events dominated anticipa-
tion events.  Although there was some variation year to year, the ratio hung
very close to 1:1, whether counted in terms of invalidated patents or invali-
dated claims.
At a patent level, this result is consistent with prior studies, which
reported a similar balance between anticipation and obviousness decisions in
district court.97  In fact, the fifty-fifty split of patent-level invalidity events
appears to have held constant for over two decades.98  No prior study has
reported this data at the level of individual claims, but it appears the balance
is roughly even at a claim level as well.
97 For example, Allison et al.’s 2014 paper reported 31 successful motions for sum-
mary judgment on the basis of anticipation and 31 successful motions for summary judg-
ment on the basis of obviousness. See Allison et al., Realities of Modern Patent Litigation,
supra note 16, at 1785 tbl.2; see also Allison et al., Divided Patent System, supra note 61, at
1104–05. But see Tu, supra note 62, at 159 (reporting that anticipation and obviousness
respectively accounted for 21.5% and 35.4% of all district court invalidations).
98 See Allison & Lemley, supra note 63, at 208 tbl.1 (1998 study of reported decisions
found 42% of invalidations relied on obviousness).  In studies of appellate decisions, Glynn
Lunney found that the percentage of cases relying on obviousness declined between the
mid-1980s and mid-1990s. See Lunney, supra note 73, at 373; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent
Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1,
14–15 (2003).  However, these studies included all grounds of invalidity (not simply antici-
pation and obviousness), and because of selection effects may not be representative of the
work of district courts during that time period.
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B. Categories of Prior Art
A primary focus of our study was the prior art relied upon by courts
when finding claims to be either anticipated or obvious.  This Section
introduces the top-level picture of that prior art; subsequent Sections explore
subcategories of prior art in more detail.
At the highest level, we classified invalidating prior art into four catego-
ries: U.S. patents (including U.S. patent applications), foreign patents
(including applications to foreign patent offices and applications filed under
the Patent Cooperation Treaty), printed publications, and activities (includ-
ing prior uses, sales, and invention by another).99  Figure 2 illustrates the
percentage of claim-level invalidity events relying on each category of prior
art.
FIGURE 2: BASIS FOR INVALIDITY
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The anticipation data is straightforward to interpret.  Represented by the
solid black columns, the majority of anticipation invalidations (52%) relied
on prior art classified as activities.  The other three categories were invoked
much less frequently, ranging from 19% (U.S. patents) to 13% (printed pub-
lications) down to 10% (foreign patents).100  Note that these final three cate-
gories are quite close in their comparative frequency, and the 6% of
anticipation invalidations in the “unknown” category could swing their com-
parative significance.  By contrast, the dominance of activity-based prior art
for anticipation invalidations is clear.101
99 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), (g) (2006).
100 Because an anticipation ruling may rely on only one piece of prior art, the percent-
ages atop the black columns sum to one.
101 Some readers may wonder whether the percentage of invalidations relying on activ-
ity prior art has changed since the advent of inter partes review (IPR). See 35 U.S.C.
§ 311(b) (2012).  Because many patents are now invalidated in IPR, where activity-based
prior art is not admissible, it seems plausible that a reverse selection effect might increase
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The picture of obviousness is more complicated, as a result of the doc-
trine’s flexibility to rely on multiple prior art references.  Overall, U.S. pat-
ents appeared to be the most important single category for obviousness
invalidations, with 29% of invalidation events drawing exclusively on U.S. pat-
ent prior art.  Printed publications and activities were effectively in a tie for
second place: with 13% of obviousness invalidations drawing exclusively on
printed publications and 7% of obviousness invalidations drawing exclusively
on activity prior art, these two categories were within the margin of error
resulting from the 8% of obviousness invalidations for which we could not
determine the prior art.  Only 2% of our observed obviousness events relied
exclusively on foreign patents.
But Figure 2 reveals that the single most common kind of obviousness
invalidation was none of the above.  Indeed, 41% of obviousness invalidations
involved “mixed” prior art—that is, the court relied on at least one reference
in one category and at least one reference in a different category.  Therefore,
to obtain a clear picture of how courts use prior art to find claims obvi-
ousness, we have to deal with the phenomenon of cross-category
combinations.
One way to do this is to consider the number of invalidations relying on
any prior art in each category:
FIGURE 3: BASIS FOR INVALIDITY—OBVIOUSNESS
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Figure 3 illustrates the number of obviousness invalidations citing any
art in each category as a percentage of all obviousness invalidations.  As
shown above, 63% of obviousness invalidations cited at least one U.S. pat-
ent—confirming the dominance of that category as reflected in the single-
category analysis of Figure 2.  Printed publications and activity prior art like-
the number of district court cases involving activity prior art in the future.  This possibility
is explored in Section V.B.
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wise remain tied for second place.  With 34% of obviousness invalidations
citing at least one printed publication and 28% of obviousness invalidations
citing at least one activity, these two categories were within the margin of
error resulting from the 8% of obviousness invalidations for which we could
not determine the prior art.  The most dramatic difference between Figure 2
and Figure 3 was in courts’ reliance on foreign patents.  Though foreign pat-
ents were almost never the exclusive basis for obviousness, they played a sup-
porting role in about 20% of obviousness invalidations.
The columns of Figure 3 sum to more than 100% because of cross-cate-
gory obviousness invalidations.  An obviousness invalidation relying on refer-
ences from multiple categories will appear within multiple columns, thus
pushing the total above 100%.102  (The same explanation applies in several
subsequent figures presenting the percentage of obviousness invalidations
citing any art in a particular category.)
The following Sections will explore each of these categories in greater
detail, beginning with printed publications.
C. Printed Publications
The incentivizing power of revoking a patent can vary significantly
within these top-level categories.  The printed publication category is per-
haps the best example of this.  On one extreme, an invalidation based on a
printed publication can punish a fraudster who sought to claim an invention
that was already widely known throughout an industry.  Alternatively, a very
similar invalidation could involve a piece of prior art that wasn’t widely
known but that a reasonably diligent search would have revealed.  Or, to go
to the opposite extreme, an invalidation based on a printed publication
could be a case of tough luck, one in which the inventor did everything right
but nonetheless was ensnared by an obscure publication neither she nor any
of her peers had ever seen.103
The incentivizing value of invalidating patents based on printed publica-
tions varies to these extremes in part because the Federal Circuit has inter-
preted the category so expansively.  A publicly accessible document found
anywhere in the world may qualify as prior art, even if it would have been
extremely difficult to find at the time of invention.104  Indeed, under the
Federal Circuit’s Klopfenstein test, printed publication can include things that
colloquially would not be understood as “publications” at all—such as slide
shows, poster boards, and handouts displayed or distributed at confer-
102 The fact that the columns in Figure 3 sum to 153% reveals that at least a few obvi-
ousness invalidations rely on art in three or four categories.  As Figure 2 shows, 41% of all
obviousness invalidations were in the “mixed” category.  If these invalidations cited art in
only two categories, Figure 3’s columns would sum to 141%.  The sum exceeds that
because some invalidations appear in either three or four categories.
103 See Yelderman, Value of Accuracy, supra note 12, at 1272–76.
104 See id. at 1274–75.
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ences.105  This approach has been criticized,106 though its effects have not
been previously quantified.
To determine whether the printed publications used in court typically fit
the colloquial understanding of that term or exploit the fringes of Klopfen-
stein, we classified publications into a number of subcategories.  Figure 4 illus-
trates the percentage of claim-level invalidity events relying on each
subcategory of printed publications.
FIGURE 4: BASIS FOR INVALIDITY—PRINTED PUBLICATIONS
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Encouragingly, Figure 4 reveals that the majority of printed publications
relied upon by district courts were conventional printed publications—that
is, regularly published books and journals of the type a library might collect
and an interested researcher might access.107  These regularly published
books and journals were behind 51% of anticipation events citing a printed
publication, and were cited in 68% of obviousness invalidations relying on
any publications.
By contrast, anticipation based on publications in the “other” category
was surprisingly small—just 19% of anticipation events citing a printed publi-
cation.  These were Klopfenstein-style references, documents that fail the test
of being a regularly published book or journal (and that are not catalogs,
manuals, or brochures, as discussed below).  To provide just a few examples
of publications in this “other” category, we observed prior art publications
105 See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350–52 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
106 See, e.g., Margo A. Bagley, Academic Disclosure and Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents in
Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 221 (2006).
107 For purposes of classification, a book was in this category if its citation included the
name of a publisher (distinct from the author) and a year of publication.  A journal was in
this category if its citation referred to a multiple-volume periodical and a year of publica-
tion.  This category also includes publicly available documentation of industry or govern-
ment standards.
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consisting of poster boards displayed at conferences, industry whitepapers,
proposals circulated at working group meetings of technical standards bod-
ies, doctoral dissertations, and postings on internet discussion forums.  The
accessibility of these various documents ranges somewhat (and, in some
cases, might be debatable), but none of them can be described as a regularly
published book or journal.
The good news is that publications in this “other” category were only
rarely the basis for anticipation.  Moreover, the category becomes even less
significant when one considers that only 13% of anticipation invalidations
rely on printed publications at all.108  From the perspective of anticipation
overall, these nontraditional publications were the basis for only 2.4% of
anticipation events—a tiny fraction of the work of district courts.
Nontraditional publications were somewhat more common in cases of
obviousness, but nonetheless were cited in a minority of cases.  Among obvi-
ousness invalidations citing any publications, only 27% cited a publication in
the “other” category.  As a fraction of all obviousness invalidations, reliance
on this category was rare: roughly 9% of all obviousness events cited a non-
traditional publication.
However, we must note that were also some printed publications that
defied further classification.  Generally, these were cases in which the court
used a shorthand citation—for example, the “Jones document”—which we
were unable to disambiguate.  These may have been traditional publications
or obscure ones; we simply cannot tell.
Fortunately, among cases of anticipation, the number of unclassified ref-
erences was small enough (6%) that it could not change our conclusion that
reliance on Klopfenstein-style publications appears to be rare.  However, there
were significantly more unclassifiable publications cited in cases of obvi-
ousness.  If every unclassified reference turned out to belong in the “other”
category (a worst-case scenario), it is possible that up to 16% of all obvi-
ousness invalidations would rely on at least one nontraditional publication.
Finally, we coded a subcategory of catalogs, manuals, and brochures—
written documents distributed to teach the public about the features or avail-
ability of a product.  Although not traditional reference publications, these
documents are typically disseminated widely to either promote or accompany
an item for sale.
These publications were not cited with great frequency.  Among invali-
dations citing publications, 24% of anticipation events and 15% of obvi-
ousness events cited a catalog, manual, or brochure.  From the perspective of
invalidity overall, the numbers are smaller still—only about 3% of all antici-
pation events and 5% of all obviousness events cite any documents in this
category.  But despite its infrequent appearance in court, this category is at
least conceptually important, as it is something of a chimera.  While legally
these references are qualifying as prior art under the “publication” gate,
from the perspective of a hypothetical art searcher they have more in com-
108 See supra Figure 2.
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mon with activity prior art.  (Libraries, after all, do not typically maintain
collections of product manuals, brochures, and catalogs.)109  Moreover, in
practice, these publications are often introduced as documentation of activi-
ties that could alternatively have qualified under the “public use” or “on sale”
gates.  Depending on how one conceives of prior art in this subcategory,
activity prior art may be even more significant than the top-level classifica-
tions would suggest.
D. U.S. Patents as Prior Art
The next category of prior art is U.S. patents—defined to include both
granted patents and published applications.  Because of the highly structured
and centralized nature of these documents, we have the richest data on them
of all the prior art categories.  For example, we know precisely what was filed,
when, by whom, and when that information actually became visible to the
public.  There are also a few special legal rules about how U.S. patents are
treated as prior art, so a bit of background will be helpful here.
It might seem that, as a category, U.S. patents and patent applications
would be the easiest form of prior art for a prospective inventor to discover.
Granted patents and published applications are stored in a single, centralized
repository.110  They are written in English.  They are text searchable in a
number of free, publicly accessible databases, including the PTO’s own web-
site.  And each patent and application has been assigned a field classification,
allowing a searcher to quickly narrow her inquiry to the documents most
likely to be relevant.111  All of this would suggest that invalidations based on
U.S. patent prior art will reliably constitute a valuable and highly incentiviz-
ing form of error correction.112
But there is a catch.  Under certain conditions, U.S. patents and patent
applications can be actually impossible for the inventor to find at the time
she makes her application.  The reason has to do with special prior art timing
rules that apply only to U.S. patents and patent applications.  The timing rule
that applies to all other categories of prior art is straightforward: a disclosure
becomes legally effective as prior art on the day that information becomes
109 Moreover, some of these publications were apparently only available through
purchase of a larger product, which may make acquiring them financially impractical for
libraries.
110 The PTO began publishing certain patent applications in the year 2000.  Press
Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Will Begin Publishing Patent Applica-
tions (Nov. 27, 2000), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/uspto-will-begin-pub
lishing-patent-applications.
111 See USPTO Patent Full-Text and Image Database, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://
patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-bool.html (last updated Oct. 22, 2019).
112 If one reason for revoking patents is to encourage reasonably diligent art searches
before inventing or filing a patent, that reasonably diligent search surely includes a trip to
the PTO’s own patent database. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 46, at 398–402;
Yelderman, Value of Accuracy, supra note 12, at 1267–68, 1274–75.
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available to the public.113  For example, a journal article qualifies as prior art
on the day it is published;114 a sale of a product qualifies on the day that sale is
made.115  But a different timing rule applies to U.S. patents and patent appli-
cations.  Their disclosure qualifies as prior art on the day the underlying
application was filed.116
What makes this tricky is that applications are legally protected as secret
when they first arrive at the PTO.117  They can persist in this secret form until
one of two things happens: (1) they are published (which typically occurs
eighteen months after filing, though an applicant can opt out of this proce-
dure); or (2) they result in a granted patent (typically many years after fil-
ing).118  Until one of those triggering events occurs, pending applications
are not prior art.  But the moment one of those things does occur, the appli-
cation springs back in time, and becomes retroactively effective as prior
art.119  No other category of prior art is treated this way.120
Because of this springing rule, U.S. patents and patent applications can
be either the most obscure form of prior art or the most accessible.  The
difference comes down to timing.  If the prior art patent was published or
granted before the focal patent was filed, it is certainly the kind of thing a
reasonable art search should have uncovered.  But if the prior art patent was
not granted or published until later, the prospective inventor would have had
no way of discovering it, no matter how much she may have invested in
searching.121
113 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).  Patents also formally qualify for this timing treat-
ment, though the preferential rules discussed momentarily will render this path superflu-
ous in many situations.
114 See Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d. 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(noting that printed publication is effective as prior art on the date it becomes publicly
accessible).
115 There are, naturally, a few complications.  For example, an offer for sale can qualify
as prior art as soon as the invention is “ready for patenting”—even if the offer itself does
not disclose any specific information about the invention. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525
U.S. 55, 66–68 (1998).
116 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (2006).  This assumes, however, that they eventually publish
or are granted.  If not, these applications remain secret and never become prior art. See id.
§ 122.
117 See id.
118 See id.
119 Sean B. Seymore, When Patents Claim Preexisting Knowledge, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1965, 1969–71 (2017).
120 For an argument that printed publications ought to receive the same treatment, see
id. at 1979–81.
121 This springing mechanism can even stymie patent examiners—though they have
access to pending applications, they are not permitted to cite them until they become
public.  It is thus possible for a patent to be valid the day it is granted, but later become
invalid as a result of subsequent events in the life of a different pending application.
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Though this special treatment of U.S. patent prior art is nearly a century
old,122 it appears that its effects have never been quantified.  To determine
the frequency with which courts rely on these rules, we supplemented our
district court dataset with various PTO datasets providing application filing,
publication, and grant dates for both the focal and cited patents.123  Compar-
ing these dates allowed us to place each invalidity event into one of three
categories: (a) the springing mechanism was unambiguously necessary for
the cited patent to qualify as prior art; (b) the springing mechanism was
unambiguously unnecessary for the cited patent to qualify as prior art; or (c)
the springing mechanism might have played a role in qualifying the cited
patent as prior art.124
FIGURE 5: U.S. PATENT PRIOR ART
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122 The springing prior art rule was created judicially, though it has since been codi-
fied. See Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390, 400–02 (1926); 35
U.S.C. § 102(e) (2006).
123 We use the term “focal patent” to refer to the patent that is the subject of the valid-
ity inquiry.  In contrast, the “cited patent” is the one that threatens to invalidate the focal
patent.
124 The reason we could not always conclusively determine whether there was reliance
on the springing prior art rule is that, in some scenarios, qualification as prior art would
have depended on the focal patent’s date of invention, which is distinct from its filing date.
For example, if the cited patent was granted or published less than a year before the focal
patent was filed, its status as prior art (in a world without springing rules) would turn on
when the invention of the focal patent was actually invented.  Date of invention is a com-
plex question for litigation, and one that the springing rule itself may have avoided the
need to litigate.  In these ambiguous cases, the springing mechanism made it easier to
qualify the prior art, but we cannot say whether or not the same art would have qualified
absent a springing mechanism.
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As Figure 5 illustrates, the springing mechanism of U.S. patents appear
central to their use as prior art by district courts.  In 34% of the claim-level
anticipation events in which the focal patent was anticipated by a U.S. patent,
the springing timing rule was unambiguously necessary for the cited patent
to qualify as prior art.125  Moreover, in an additional 30% of these anticipa-
tion events, the springing prior art rules might have played a role in qualify-
ing the cited patent as prior art.  In only 36% of anticipation events based on
U.S. patents was the springing prior rule unambiguously unnecessary.126
The upshot, though, is that anticipation based on U.S. patents is overall quite
rare—U.S. patents are cited in only about 19% of all anticipation events to
begin with.  From the perspective of invalidity overall, the springing rule was
relied upon for somewhere between 7% and 16% of anticipation events.
For obviousness, the percentage of patents relying on springing rules to
qualify as prior art was also quite high.  In 26% of claim-level obviousness
decisions that cited any U.S. patents, the springing rule was necessary to qual-
ifying one or more of them.  Moreover, in another 26% of claim-level obvi-
ousness decisions that cited any U.S. patents, the springing rule was potentially
necessary to qualifying one or more of them.  In only 48% of obviousness
events citing U.S. patents was there unambiguously no reliance on the spring-
ing prior art rules.  But in contrast with anticipation, obviousness draws on
U.S. patents as prior art with great frequency.127  From the perspective of
invalidity overall, somewhere between 18% and 35% of all obviousness invali-
dations relied on patents that were secret at the time of filing.
Unless the content of these applications was also disclosed somewhere
else, it is hard to see how these could be inventor-incentivizing error correc-
tion.  At the time the applicant filed her patent, there was no lawful way for
125 To qualify for the “certain reliance” category, the prior art patent could not have
been published or issued until a date after the focal patent’s priority date.  For purpose of
determining the priority dates of focal patents, we considered only the most reliable forms
of priority claims—continuations, divisionals, reissues, and national entry from a Patent
Cooperation Treaty application.  We excluded priority claims that are more vulnerable to
attack in litigation, such as foreign priority claims, provisionals, and continuations-in-part.
This will tend to understate the number of cases in which the springing rules were neces-
sary to qualify the patent as prior art.
126 To qualify for the “no reliance” category, the prior art needed to be published or
issued more than one year prior to the focal patent’s earliest domestic priority claim.  In
these cases, the challenger could rely on § 102(b), making the springing mechanism irrele-
vant. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
We should emphasize that we have been extremely conservative in drawing the line
between cases in which the springing rules certainly or possibly played a role in qualifying
the patent as prior art.  For example, a large number of anticipating patents would have
moved into the “certain” column if we had assumed that the focal patent was entitled to
the benefit of its provisional filing date.  In these cases, the springing prior art rules made
the provisional filing irrelevant.  However, we classified these as cases of potential reliance
because, in a hypothetical world without the springing prior art rules, the focal patent’s
priority claim to that provisional might have failed.
127 Recall that 63% of obviousness events cited at least one U.S. patent. See supra Figure
3.
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her to access the prior art that later invalidated her claims.  Invalidation on
these facts might serve some purposes, but creating future incentives for
inventors to break into the PTO to read secret applications is not one of
them.
E. Activity
As noted above, more than half of anticipation events rely on art in the
“activity” category—prior uses, sales, and earlier invention by someone else.
And nearly a third (28%) of obviousness events drew at least partially on
prior activities.
The obscurity of art in the activity category can vary widely.  For exam-
ple, prior invention by another128 is almost inevitably obscure.  (If the prior
inventor had sold or allowed the public to use the invention, those activities
would qualify directly, avoiding the need to jump through the doctrinal hur-
dles of prior invention.)129  Uses and sales, by contrast, can be extremely
prominent—such as a keynote address streamed around the world, or a
product sold to millions of customers.130  But they can also be more discrete
than that.  Only a single use or sale is necessary to create activity prior art.131
And that single use or sale could be something as undiscoverable as a two-
party contract,132 or an undergarment worn under clothing around town.133
The good news is that the obscure outer reaches of the doctrine appear
to be relied upon only rarely.  Prior invention by another, for example, con-
stitutes a distinct minority of activity prior art.  Among anticipation events
citing activity, prior invention was the basis for only about 8% of claim invali-
dations.  Prior invention played a role in obviousness in a trivial number of
cases—about 1.1% of obviousness events citing any activity.  Together, they
represented a very small share of invalidity overall—roughly 2.4% of all
claim-level invalidation events.  And that number will only be going down
over time, as the category was completely eliminated through recent statutory
amendments.134
128 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (2006).
129 See Thomson, S.A. v. Quixote Corp., 166 F.3d 1172, 1175–76, 1175 n.3 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (summarizing requirements for § 102(g)(2)).
130 Famously, one of Apple’s German patents was invalidated based on Steve Jobs’s
original iPhone keynote address.  Mikey Campbell, Steve Jobs’ Original iPhone Keynote Video
Used to Invalidate Apple Patent in Germany, APPLEINSIDER (Sept. 26, 2013), https://apple
insider.com/articles/13/09/27/steve-jobs-original-iphone-keynote-video-used-to-invali
date-apple-patent-in-germany.
131 See, e.g., id.
132 See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 62–63 (1998).
133 See Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 337–38 (1881).
134 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(b), 125 Stat. 284,
285–87 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012)).  These new rules take effect based on
a patent’s effective filing date, see id. § 3(b)(1), so courts will continue to apply the pre-AIA
prior art rules in at least some cases for many years.  During our study period the pre-AIA
prior art rules were overwhelmingly the operative law; in fact, we observed only one case of
a court applying the new, post-AIA prior art rules.  The infrequency with which courts
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It is difficult to determine whether a particular invalidating use or sale
was widespread, as the prominence of a use or sale is usually doctrinally irrel-
evant.  To get a bit of purchase on this question, we coded whether activity
prior art was based on potentially secret uses or sales, such as when proof of a
prior sale relied on a particular contract or proposal,135 or the public use was
performed by a limited and specifically identified group of people.136  Con-
struing these categories as broadly as possible,137 it nonetheless appeared
that nonpublic uses and sales made up a small fraction of activity prior art.
Potentially secret uses or sales were the basis for only about 14% of anticipa-
tion invalidations citing activity prior art.138  For obviousness, these cases
were even rarer: only about 2% of obviousness invalidations relying on activ-
relied on prior invention under pre-AIA law suggests that the elimination of this category
will not significantly affect our results.
135 For a canonical example in this category, see Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67–68 (noting that a
purchase agreement with a single customer triggered the “on sale” bar).
136 For canonical examples in this category, see Egbert, 104 U.S. at 337 (noting that
friend’s unrestricted use of corset constituted public use); JumpSport, Inc. v. Jumpking, Inc.,
191 F. App’x 926, 935 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that neighbors’ use of trampoline in inven-
tor’s backyard constituted public use); and Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1121–22
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (explaining that five demonstration prototypes installed on the boats of
friends and associates constituted public use).  This category also included cases in which
the inventor used the patented method in house for ultimately commercial purposes. See
D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 714 F.2d 1144, 1147–48 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting
that inventor used patented method to manufacture products, which it then offered for
sale); see also Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520
(2d Cir. 1946) (recognizing this as prior art).
While “performed by a limited and specifically identified group of people” may sound
vague in principle, it was straightforward in application.  Public uses at trade shows were
excluded from this subcategory because they presumably involved use by an open set of
attendees.  No other public use cases presented a close question of classification.
137 These subcategories are likely overbroad, and therefore may tend to overstate the
significance of secret prior art.  For example, a private sale made under a bilateral contract
may or may not have been secret, particularly since we identified confidentiality obliga-
tions for a very small number of such sales.  We employed these categories (despite their
likely overbreadth) in hopes of establishing an upper bound on the number of cases rely-
ing on nonpublic uses and sales.  In the other direction, it is possible that we may have
omitted some cases of secret activity in which the activity’s qualification as prior art simply
went uncontested.  For example, if the parties stipulated to the activity qualifying as prior
art, the record may have been silent on the nature of the use or sale, and we may have
coded it as a case of implicitly public activity.  However, because the path to qualifying
secret activities as prior art is fraught with multifactor balancing tests and exceptions, see
Dey, L.P. v. Sunovion Pharm., Inc., 715 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2013), we think it is
unlikely that there would be many cases in which the patent holder would avoid raising
that issue when it was otherwise contestable.  Nonetheless, to the extent patent holders
may have conceded that certain nonpublic activities qualified as prior art, our data may
understate the significance of secret prior art.
138 For an additional 1.4% of anticipation events citing activity, the potentially secret
nature of that activity was coded as “unknown.”  These were cases in which the court relied
on activity prior art, but sealed records or other obstacles prevented us from discerning
whether the art bore indicia of potentially secret activity.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-2\NDL207.txt unknown Seq: 35  7-JAN-20 14:54
2019] prior  art  in  the  district  court 871
ity prior art cited any potentially secret uses or sales.139  As a share of invalid-
ity overall, secret uses and sales were cited in fewer than 4.25% of claim
invalidations.140
But even aside from these rare cases of prior invention and potentially
secret uses and sales, the incentivizing value of invalidation based on prior
activities remains ambiguous.  For one, public uses and sales that are undeni-
ably public can still be small scale—such as the sale to a handful of select
customers.  Moreover, even when a use or sale was widespread, these activi-
ties may not leave the kind of publicly searchable records that a third party
could be expected to find years after that activity has ceased.  If an inventor
did not have actual knowledge of a prior use or sale, it is difficult to say
whether she ought to have known about that use or sale.
Nonetheless, cutting across all of these complications, there is one class
of activities that the inventor certainly should have known about: uses and
sales she conducted herself.  Revoking patents in light of the inventor’s own
prior activities is a reliably incentivizing form of error correction.  As the
Supreme Court has explained, a principal reason for having this prior art
category in the first place is to prevent inventors from extending the patent
term.141  If an inventor could reap commercial benefit from her invention
and file a patent many years later, she could enjoy effectively exclusivity much
greater than the statute prescribes.  Revoking a patent in that situation dis-
courages such subterfuge, vindicating a core justification for the prior use/
sale category.142
For similar but distinct reasons, invalidation based on the defendant’s
prior activities is a reliably valuable form of error correction.  A defendant
asserting his own prior uses and sales as prior art is not seeking to escape
liability on a technicality of patent law.  Rather, he is asserting his right to
continue the activities he has been performing since before the inventor
came along.  Though not necessarily incentivizing for future inventors,
revoking patents that would cover the defendant’s preinvention activities
serves an important function in ensuring that the patent system does not take
things out of the public domain.143
To attempt to classify invalidity events on these lines, we coded instances
in which the court mentioned that the invalidating activity was performed by
one of the parties.  The results of this coding are shown in Figure 6.
139 For an additional 4.4% of obviousness events citing activity, the potentially secret
nature of that activity was coded as “unknown.”
140 If one includes cases in which the potentially secret nature of that activity was coded
as “unknown,” this upper limit rises to 5.3%.  Note that there was recently a live contro-
versy as to whether the “secret uses and sales” category of prior art might have been abro-
gated by the AIA.  We now know that it was not. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628, 630 (2019) (holding that AIA did not change the mean-
ing of “on sale”).
141 See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63–64 (1998).
142 See Helsinn Healthcare, S.A., 139 S. Ct. at 632–33.
143 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974).
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FIGURE 6: BASIS FOR INVALIDITY—ACTIVITY
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As Figure 6 shows, the majority of anticipating activities could be traced
back to one of the parties in suit.  Among anticipation events citing activity,
27% involved plaintiff-related activities, and another 27% involved defen-
dant-related activities.  Less than half (46%) of anticipating activities had no
identifiable relationship to either party.
The same does not hold for obviousness, however.  Among obviousness
events citing any activity prior art, 13% cited any plaintiff-related activity, and
another 14% cited any defendant-related activity.  The vast majority of activ-
ity-based obviousness events (73%) involved activity that could not be traced
to either party.
We must acknowledge some potential for underreporting of party rela-
tionships.  There is often no legal significance to the fact that a sale or use
was made by the plaintiff or the defendant, so in many cases the court may
simply not have mentioned a party relationship, even if one was present.144
Therefore, the “no identified relationship” category likely includes some inval-
idation events involving party-related art that our coding failed to identify.
Despite these limitations, this is overall encouraging news for the value
of invalidation based on anticipation.  As mentioned above, prior invention
and potentially secret uses and sales were rarely the basis for anticipation.
But it was even more unusual for a court to rely on those activities when they
bore no relationship to either party.  Fewer than 4% of all anticipation invali-
dations cited the prior invention or potentially secret uses or sales of a non-
party.  By contrast, the prior activities of either the plaintiff or the defendant
comprised about 28% of all anticipation events.
144 This might explain the apparent disparity in third-party activity art relied upon for
obviousness compared to anticipation—with multiple references at play, it may have been
less likely for the court to mention a party relationship in passing.  Alternatively, obvi-
ousness invalidations may simply be more likely to rely on third-party activities.
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The obviousness data fails to present a similarly upbeat picture.  While
obviousness based on prior invention or potentially secret uses or sales is
quite rare, we were unable to discern a party relationship for the vast majority
of activities cited as prior art.  This does not mean these invalidations were
not incentivizing (or that they lack value under some other theory)—it simply
means we could not find the same indicia of error-correction value in cases of
obviousness that we were able to find in cases of anticipation.
F. Foreign Patents
By any measure, foreign patents were the category of prior art least com-
monly relied upon in district court.  Still, about 10% of anticipation invalida-
tions relied on foreign patents, and 20% of obviousness invalidations were
built in partial reliance on them.  This reliance was almost always partial—as
a category, foreign patents were sufficient by themselves to establish obvi-
ousness in only 2% of obviousness events.  Thus, in the vast majority of obvi-
ousness events involving a foreign patent, the court combined that patent
with a reference in another category.
It is difficult to generalize about the obscurity of foreign patents.  On the
one hand, they exist in centralized repositories.  On the other hand, the ease
of searching foreign patents can vary greatly depending on the country.  In
the majority of foreign patent offices, the proceedings are conducted in a
language other than English.  And, of course, there are a lot of patent
offices—well over a hundred—spread all around the world.145
That said, for many cases in this category, searching foreign patent
offices wouldn’t actually be necessary.  In over half of anticipation events
involving a foreign patent, it was the inventor’s own foreign patent that was
the problem:
145 At last count, there are 164 signatories to TRIPS and 153 signatories to the Patent
Cooperation Treaty. See Other IP Treaties: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/wipo
lex/en/other_treaties/parties.jsp?treaty_id=231&group_id=22 (last visited Oct. 9, 2019);
The PCT Now Has 153 Contracting States, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/
pct/en/pct_contracting_states.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2019).
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FIGURE 7: BASIS FOR INVALIDITY—FOREIGN PATENT
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As Figure 7 illustrates, among anticipation events citing a foreign patent,
56% relied on the inventor’s own foreign patent.  We did not identify a single
instance of the defendant’s foreign patent leading to anticipation.  The
remaining 44% of anticipation events cited a foreign patent with no identi-
fied party relationship.
Moreover, it appears that even these remaining 44% of foreign patents
could have been found with a modest amount of searching.  Excluding cases
in which the inventor’s own foreign patent was the fatal prior art, 92% of the
foreign patents cited for anticipation could have been found by searching
just three foreign patent offices: the Japan Patent Office, the European Pat-
ent Office, and the World Intellectual Property Organization.  It was
extremely rare for a U.S. patent to be anticipated by a foreign patent that
bore no relationship to the plaintiff and that could not be found in those
three offices.  Such cases constituted less than 1% of all anticipation events.
The inventor’s-own-patent explanation does much less work when it
comes to obviousness.  Among obviousness events drawing on any foreign
patents, only 9% involved a foreign patent with an identified relationship to
the U.S. inventor.  We did identify 3% of obviousness events involving a for-
eign patent with a relationship to the defendant.  Still, 88% of obviousness
events citing a foreign patent, we could not identify any relationship between
that foreign patent and the parties in suit.146
In addition, a wider search would sometimes be required to find the
nonparty foreign patents cited for obviousness than it would in cases of antic-
ipation.  Searching at the Japan Patent Office, the European Patent Office,
146 As with activity, however, there is potential for undercounting.  The fact of a party
relationship would not always be legally relevant and so may have gone unmentioned by
the court.  We therefore expect that the “no identified party relationship” category likely
includes some cases in which there was such a relationship that simply went unidentified.
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and the World Intellectual Property Organization would yield all the foreign
patents cited in 70% of these obviousness events.  A (virtual) trip to another
easily searchable office, the United Kingdom’s, would add another 13%.  But
that still leaves 17% of obviousness invalidations citing foreign patent prior
art that was not that plaintiff’s own work and that would require a much
broader search to discover.147  It is harder to make the case that these invali-
dations increase future incentives to search the prior art.  The good news is
that because foreign patents are an uncommon source of prior art in gen-
eral, these make up a small percentage of obviousness invalidation overall—
just above 3%.
* * *
In sum, the incentivizing value of district court anticipation decisions
appears to be quite high.  Beginning with the most common category of
prior art, the majority of anticipating activities were attributable to either the
plaintiff or defendant in the suit.  It was quite rare for a patent to be invali-
dated because the invention was previously invented by another, or because it
had been secretly used or sold by a nonparty.  As for anticipating publica-
tions, the majority that were cited were regularly published books and jour-
nals.  Presentations, handouts, and other nontraditional publications were
cited only occasionally.  In the rare cases in which foreign patents were cited,
they were typically the inventor’s own prior patents, and even those that were
not could usually be found in just three foreign patent offices.  The most
commonly cited form of obscure, anticipating prior art were secret U.S. pat-
ent applications, which made up somewhere between 7% and 13% of antici-
pation events overall.
By contrast, the picture of obviousness is in many ways ambiguous, and
when it is not ambiguous, it is discouraging.  Whether the cited art was an
activity or foreign patent, it rarely had an identifiable party relationship.  This
is possibly a result of underreporting—courts simply may not have taken the
time to mention party relationships when there were multiple references at
issue.  But it could also reflect greater obscurity in the art used to show obvi-
ousness.  Taken at face value, the data suggests it was unusual for the patent
owner or defendant’s own prior work to be cited to establish obviousness.
Putting aside party relationship, obviousness invalidations often relied
on obscure prior art.  Nontraditional publications were cited in approxi-
mately 9% to 16% of obviousness events.148  Foreign patents were cited in
20% of obviousness events,149 and those patents came from a longer tail of
147 Beyond these four patent offices, we observed small numbers of obviousness invali-
dations citing patents from Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, and Portu-
gal.  Each of these constituted fewer than 4% of all obviousness invalidations citing any
foreign patent.  In addition, for about 3% of the obviousness events citing a foreign patent,
the country of that foreign patent was coded as “unknown.”
148 See supra Figure 4.  This range is approximate because of publications in the “unclas-
sified” category. See supra p. 864.
149 See supra Figure 3.
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foreign patent offices.150  And secret U.S. patent applications were cited in
somewhere between 18% and 35% of obviousness events overall.  In sum, it
appears that somewhere between a third and a half of obviousness invalida-
tions drew on prior art not easily accessible to a person of skill in the art at
the time of the invention.  These invalidations could still yield public bene-
fits, but evidence from the district court fails to show that they reliably pro-
vided an inventor-incentivizing form of error correction.
IV. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF REPLACING LITIGATION WITH EXAMINATION
Apart from assessing the public benefits of patent litigation, one might
also wonder whether a different procedural tool could provide similar bene-
fits at lower cost.  The expense of invalidating patents in district court is
sobering.  For example, a rough calculation would suggest that invalidating
these 3320 claims on prior art grounds likely cost the parties something
around $3 billion151—or roughly $1 million per invalidated claim.152  (And
that number does not even include the court’s time or discovery costs
imposed on third parties.)  If a different procedural mechanism could pro-
duce similar public benefits at lower cost, it may be preferable to district
court patent litigation.
An obvious competing tool for this job is the initial round of examina-
tion at the PTO.  Every single one of the claims invalidated in court was previ-
ously scrutinized by the expert agency and ruled to be patentable.  Millions
of dollars and several years later,153 a court reached the opposite conclusion.
Even if the PTO is imperfect, it certainly seems plausible that the agency
150 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
151 This back-of-the-envelope figure is derived as follows: The 3320 claims invalidated
on prior art grounds involved 233 patents litigated to summary judgment and 258 patents
litigated through trial.  Because roughly half of patent challenges succeed, we must double
those numbers to calculate the number of judgments necessary to produce those invalida-
tions. See Allison et al., Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, supra note 16, at 1787; Allison &
Lemley, supra note 63, at 205.  Finally, litigation surveys indicate that fighting a patent to
summary judgment costs each party about $1 million, and that fighting a patent to trial costs
each party about $2 million. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, 2017 REPORT OF THE
ECONOMIC SURVEY 46 (2017).  Thus, the estimated costs in party attorneys’ fees for these
cases come to (2 x 233 x 2 x $1 million) + (2 x 258 x 2 x $2 million) = $2.996 billion.  This
estimate is extremely conservative.  For comparison, Mark Lemley has suggested that we
spend about $2.1 billion per year litigating patents.  Lemley, supra note 21, at 1502.  Frakes
and Wasserman imply the number is about $1.3 billion per year. See Michael D. Frakes &
Melissa F. Wasserman, Irrational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 72 VAND. L. REV. 975, 1001–02
(2019) (5561 expected case-application pairs per year multiplied by $234k per case-applica-
tion pair).
152 To be clear, some of these cases also invalidated additional claims on non–prior art
grounds, which are not counted in the total above.  We cannot say exactly how many addi-
tional claims were invalidated on non–prior art grounds, as we coded these invalidations
only at a patent level.  However, about 15% of the patents experiencing prior-art-based
invalidity also experienced non-prior-art invalidity during the study period.
153 The median claim in our dataset had been in force for about six years at the time it
was invalidated—and 25% of claims had been in force for nearly eleven years or more.
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could have avoided issuing these 3320 claims for something less than $3
billion.
The challenge with catching unpatentable claims at the examination
stage is that the volume of patents examined is orders of magnitude larger
than the volume of patents litigated to judgment.  For example, in fiscal year
2015, the PTO received 589,410 utility patent applications and granted
298,407 utility patents.154  Since we observed an average of 196 distinct pat-
ents invalidated in court a year, that means that for every single patent invali-
dated in court, there were about 3000 applications filed and 1500 patents
granted.  So while the PTO might be able to catch invalid patents more
cheaply than courts, those cost advantages are potentially offset by the sheer
volume of applications that must be put through the examination process.
For fifteen years, the prevailing view—best articulated in Mark Lemley’s
highly influential article, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office155—has been
that initiatives to expend more resources at the examination stage cannot
survive cost-benefit analysis.156  Relying on some rough figures and a number
of assumptions, Lemley showed that it would be extremely difficult for
increased examination scrutiny to pay for itself by reducing the need for pat-
ent litigation.157  Because so many more patents are examined than litigated,
the argument goes, litigation cost savings are almost structurally incapable of
justifying higher examination costs.  Instead, we are better off with a “just-in-
time” model of accuracy, in which low-intensity examination is followed by
high-intensity litigation in the small number of cases that require it.158
A recent empirical project, however, has challenged Lemley’s assump-
tions and called for a reconsideration of the viability of increasing examina-
tion scrutiny.  In Irrational Ignorance at the Patent Office, Michael Frakes and
Melissa Wasserman draw on micro-level application data to predict that the
benefits of giving patent examiners more time would offset its substantial
costs.159  Though there are a number of components to their analysis, their
most important divergence from Lemley comes down to the volume of pat-
ent litigation that could be precluded through greater investment at the
examination stage.  For purposes of rough calculation, Lemley assumed that
doubling the amount of time available to examiners for each patent applica-
tion would reduce the number of issued patents (and therefore patent litiga-
154 U.S. Patent Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963–2018, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last updated Nov. 26,
2019).
155 Lemley, supra note 21.  It would be difficult to overstate the influence of Rational
Ignorance—as of this writing, it had been cited more than 640 times, according to Westlaw.
A recent analysis listed Rational Ignorance as the ninth-most-cited private-law article in the
last twenty-five years.  Ted Sichelman, Most Cited Private Law Articles Published in the Last 25
Years, NEW PRIV. L. (Apr. 22, 2015), https://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/04/22/
most-cited-private-law-articles-published-in-the-last-25-years/.
156 See Lemley, supra note 21, at 1497.
157 See id. at 1507–11.
158 See id. at 1510–11.
159 Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 151, at 1020–24.
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tion) by 10%.160  Relying on their newly available data, Frakes and
Wasserman predict that doubling examination time would actually reduce
litigation by 44%161—more than four times what Lemley originally assumed.
This single figure drives $491 million of their predicted annual costs savings
and is essential to their conclusion that we should be investing more at the
examination stage to improve patent quality.162
In short, one of the most important and frequently discussed policy
questions in the administration of patent law—whether the PTO should be
given more resources—comes down to an empirical prediction about how
much patent litigation could be precluded as a result of more examina-
tion.163  And, on this question, district court invalidity data can provide some
additional insight.  Frakes and Wasserman’s 44% prediction is based on a
careful and detailed study of examination.  But how plausible is this projec-
tion when viewed from the litigation side of the mountain?  Do district courts
invalidate claims based on prior art the PTO already knew about?  If not, was
the invalidating prior art something an examiner realistically could have
found?
This Part draws on our district court dataset to explore the likelihood
that increased investment in examination could avoid the need for patent
litigation.
A. Prior Art and Examination Time
Examining a patent application for anticipation and obviousness is a
two-step process.  First, the examiner must search for potentially relevant
prior art.  Second, the examiner must understand the art she finds and apply
it to make determinations about anticipation and obviousness.  The second
160 See Lemley, supra note 21, at 1508–09.
161 Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 151, at 1022–24.
162 See Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 151, at 1003.  Note that their findings diverge in
other significant ways as well.  For example, Lemley assumed that increasing examination
scrutiny would cause a fifty percent increase in the cost of obtaining a patent; Frakes and
Wasserman find that this increased scrutiny may actually reduce patent prosecution costs
overall. Compare Lemley, supra note 21, at 1508, with Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 151,
at 1024.
163 This is not to deny the possibility of other benefits.  Indeed, Frakes, Wasserman,
Lemley, and I all acknowledge that litigation costs avoided are only one benefit that might
justify increased expenditures on examination. See Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 151, at
1013–16; Lemley, supra note 21, at 1515–20; Stephen Yelderman, Coordination-Focused Pat-
ent Policy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1565, 1599–1600 (2016) (suggesting that settling questions about
patent rights at an earlier stage would increase parties’ ability to order their affairs in the
shadow of patents in the future); Yelderman, Increasing Competition, supra note 11, at
1959–61, 1980–85 (observing that litigation will not always fully mitigate the deadweight
losses imposed by invalid patents).  Litigation expenses avoided seem to occupy a central
position in the cost-benefit analysis only because they are amenable to quantification: the
costs of patent litigation are direct and publicly reported, making it straightforward to
make back-of-the-envelope predictions about savings.  By contrast, the other potential ben-
efits of increasing examination are often indirect and difficult to observe.
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step logically depends on the first in the sense that an examiner cannot
understand and apply prior art she does not have.
In terms of the additional examination time necessary to avoid issuing
an invalid patent, we can draw a distinction between failures at step one and
step two.  The lowest-hanging fruit would seem to be cases in which the
examiner knew about the relevant prior art and failed to appreciate its signif-
icance.  In cases like these, it is imminently plausible that a bit more time
would allow an examiner to avoid granting a patent, since all she would need
to do is better understand the prior art already in front of her.
Cases in which the examiner did not know about the fatal prior art are
trickier.  To avoid issuing a patent, the examiner would need to perform
both steps a bit differently: she would first need to find that additional piece
of prior art, and then she would need to correctly appreciate and apply it.
Additional examination time could still reduce the number of court-invali-
dated patents falling into this category, but logically the effectiveness of that
additional time will be lower.
We can further subdivide cases in which the prior art was not known to
the examiner, depending on whether the fatal prior art was the kind that
could be found by additional examination-style search.  If the missing prior
art was a patent or a regularly published book or journal, it is plausible that
additional examination time would have made a difference.  But if the miss-
ing prior art was an activity or a nontraditional publication, it is hard to see
how additional time would have led to a different outcome.
In sum, to assess the likelihood that an increase in examination time
would have avoided the need for litigation, we can classify our invalidation
events in this way:
TABLE 2
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 
All invalidating 
references known 
during examination 
One or more 
invalidating references 
unknown during 
examination, but all 
unknown references 
were patents or 
regularly published 
books or journals 
One or more 
invalidating references 
unknown during 
examination and falling 
in activity or 
nontraditional 
publication category 
Higher return on increased 
examination time 
Lower return on increased 
examination time 
No return on increased 
examination time 
Category 1 invalidations are cases in which every reference necessary to
sustain the district court invalidation was part of the examination record.  We
assume that these would be the highest-yield cases, in which a bit of addi-
tional examination time could go a long way.  By contrast, Category 2 invali-
dations are those in which at least one reference relied upon in court was not
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known during examination, subject to the constraint that any unknown refer-
ence was a patent (U.S. or foreign) or regularly published book or journal.
Logically, increased examination scrutiny would avoid fewer of these invalida-
tions than Category 1, but it is nonetheless plausible that a modest increase
in examination time could avoid the need for some of the litigation that
leads to these invalidations.
Category 3 invalidations are cases in which at least one reference relied
upon in court was not known during examination and that missing prior art
reference was an activity or nontraditional publication.  Because the
unknown art in these cases was practically unsearchable, we assume that no
plausible reform to examination practice would have precluded the issuance
of these patents.  For example, whether we double or triple examination
time, nothing short of imaginary reform to the PTO would suddenly permit
examiners to travel to the trade shows, conferences, or far-flung locales
where activities and nontraditional publications might be found.164
Before turning to the data, we must acknowledge an important limita-
tion of this classification scheme.  Our observations are based on patents liti-
gated to a decision of invalidity, which may have different characteristics than
patents overall.165  Moreover, litigants determine not only which patents to
litigate but also how to litigate them.  In particular, we expect that a chal-
lenger to an issued patent will have a strategic interest in avoiding Category 1
art when possible.  This is because claims that have been issued by the patent
office enjoy a statutory presumption of validity, meaning that a district court
may invalidate them only on the basis of “clear and convincing evidence.”166
But this presumption can be weakened by invoking prior art that was not
considered by the PTO.167  It is therefore in a challenger’s interest to search
164 This is not to say that the Category 3 cases are hopeless.  Reducing the number of
litigated cases in this category would simply require other tools besides more examination
time—such as increasing incentives for the applicant and third parties to disclose relevant
prior art. See generally Stephen Yelderman, Improving Patent Quality with Applicant Incentives,
28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 77 (2014).
165 For this reason, the following data should not be used to make any inferences about
patent quality overall, or even the effect that increased examination might have on the
number of patents asserted in court annually.  The question of interest here is how many
decisions of invalidity could be precluded through increased examination.  For further dis-
cussion, see infra notes 174–77 and accompanying text.
166 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 97 (2011).
167 Id. at 110.  Formally, the presumption of validity applies whether or not the evi-
dence was known to the PTO during examination. See id.  At the same time, however, the
Court has recognized that new evidence often carries “more weight” than old evidence,
and has held that the jury may be specifically instructed to consider that “it has heard
evidence that the PTO had no opportunity to evaluate before granting the patent.” Id. at
110–11.  In experimental settings, an instruction like this one seems to have the same
effect as if no heightened presumption of validity applied at all. See David L. Schwartz &
Christopher B. Seaman, Standards of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Experiment from Patent Law,
26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 432, 459–60 (2013).  Moreover, prior studies have suggested
that a challenge to patent validity is more likely to succeed if it is rooted in new art rather
than art that was known at the time of examination. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 63, at
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-2\NDL207.txt unknown Seq: 45  7-JAN-20 14:54
2019] prior  art  in  the  district  court 881
for and rely on prior art that was not before the PTO at the time of examina-
tion, even if a strong case could also be made on the basis of the art that was
before the PTO.
As a result, we expect that challengers will sometimes seek to show a
patent is anticipated or obvious on the basis of Category 2 or Category 3 art,
even if a challenge based on Category 1 art would objectively have been just
as strong.  As a result, the data may tend to understate the potential effective-
ness of additional examination, at least between Category 1 on the one hand
and Categories 2 and 3 on the other hand.168  We will begin by putting this
potential bias aside, taking the data at face value to assess the plausibility of
Lemley, Frakes, and Wasserman’s predictions.  In the end, we will explore
whether this potential complication is likely to change our conclusions.
B. Examining for Anticipation
About half of the 3320 claims we observed invalidated in district courts
were invalidated based on anticipation.  Given the strategic considerations
introduced above, one might predict that it would be quite rare to find invali-
dations in Category 1.  And yet, our data show that this happens with surpris-
ing frequency—about 30% of all claim-level anticipation events relied on art
listed right on the face of the patent.169  This is encouraging news for the
feasibility of precluding litigation by greater examination scrutiny.
Moreover, the percentage of claim-level anticipation events relying on
Category 1 was much higher for some prior art categories than others:
231–34.  (Note, however, that Allison and Lemley combined obviousness and anticipation
for purposes of this analysis. Id. at 232 tbl.10.)  For earlier studies of this question, see
Federico, supra note 71, at 249; KOENIG, supra note 67, at 5-50.
168 As between Category 2 and Category 3, we expect that challengers would tend to
rely on prior art in Category 2 when given the option.  Nontraditional publications may
trigger factual disputes over whether they satisfy the Federal Circuit’s multipart test for
qualifying as a “printed publication,” and activity prior art can raise a host of questions
about whether something was really on sale, available for patenting, being used only for
experimentation, and so on.  So while there may be some Category 3 invalidations with an
equally plausible path based on Category 1 art, it seems unlikely there are many Category 3
invalidations with an equally plausible path based on Category 2 art.
169 This number (and all those that follow in the main text of this section) excludes the
6% of anticipation events for which we could not determine the prior art underlying the
court’s determination. See supra Figure 2.  We cannot predict how these cases of unknown
prior art might affect our results, but the magnitude of any effect would be small.
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FIGURE 8: ANTICIPATION BY CITED REFERENCES
66
%
57
%
28
%
11
%
34
% 4
3%
72
%
89
%
US PATENT FOREIGN PATENT PRINTED
PUBLICATION
ACTIVITY
Invalidating art listed as examination reference
Invalidating art not listed as examination reference
Figure 8 illustrates the percentage of anticipation events relying on prior
art known to the examiner, broken down by category of prior art.  Invalida-
tion based on a U.S. patent was particularly likely to fall into Category 1—in
fully two-thirds of these anticipation events, the anticipating prior patent was
listed on the face of the focal patent.  When foreign patents were the relevant
art, they were known to the examiner in over half the cases.  Preventing the
issuance of these invalid claims would not require examiners to find art they
are currently missing; rather, it would require them to read and understand
the prior art they already have.
At first glance, it may seem that anticipating printed publications were
rarely known during examination—only 28% of these invalidations are in
Category 1.  However, it is useful to further divide this category between ref-
erence publications (things one might find in a library, such as books, jour-
nals, and industry standards) and nonreference publications (items not
typically found in a research library, such as catalogs, product manuals, and
publications in the “other” category defined in Section III.C).  When antici-
pation was based on prior art in the “reference publication” category, that art
was known to the examiner about 45% of the time.  By contrast, when antici-
pation was based on prior art in the “nonreference publication” category,
that art was known to the examiner only 10% of the time.  Activity prior art
was similar to this latter subcategory.  When anticipation was based on activ-
ity, it was listed on the face of the patent only about 11% of the time.170
170 In some of these cases, it is possible that the PTO may have had a patent reference
or printed publication that disclosed essentially the same thing as the activity prior art.
The substantive equivalence of the activity and the written prior art reference would not
always be apparent on the face of the documents we examined, so it is possible that this
number undercounts some cases in which the examiner did have the relevant art before
her.
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This gets to a more discouraging point about the prospect of examining
for anticipation: the vast majority of uncited art was in Category 3.  Though
30% of anticipation events relied on prior art known to the examiner (i.e.,
Category 1), only 15%–16% of the remaining invalidations relied on a patent
or traditional reference publication (i.e., Category 2).171  The remaining
54%–55% of anticipation events relied on an activity or publication that addi-
tional search time would be unlikely to uncover (i.e., Category 3).
Taken at face value, this does not bode well for Frakes and Wasserman’s
prediction.172  Perfect appreciation combined with perfect search of all
worldwide patents and traditional printed publication would preclude only
45%–46% of district court anticipation events.  From this vantage point, a
44% reduction in litigation expenses seems more like a theoretical limit on
what unlimited examination time might achieve, rather than the likely result
of increasing the average examination time from eighteen hours per applica-
tion to thirty-six.173  While doubling examination time would likely yield
some improvement, it seems implausible that it would permit examiners to
achieve such perfection.
On the other hand, this data also suggests that Lemley’s original 10%
prediction was implausibly low.  Three times that percentage—30%—of
anticipating references can be found right on the face of the patent itself.  So
even if examiners spent none of their additional time searching for new refer-
ences, instead focusing only on reading known prior art and applying it more
carefully, it seems likely that they could have precluded more than 10% of
our observed anticipation events.
C. Examining for Obviousness
The other half of the 3320 claim invalidations we observed were based
on obviousness.  As with anticipation, challengers have strategic incentives to
search for and rely on previously unexamined prior art whenever possible.
And the ability to invoke multiple references to make an argument for obvi-
ousness only gives challengers additional latitude to invoke previously unex-
amined art, even when the examined art may also have been sufficient basis
to invalidate the claim.174
171 The range of uncertainty here is due to the 6% of anticipation events that cited a
publication that defied further classification. See supra Figure 4.
172 To be clear, Frakes and Wasserman do not make any predictions at this level of
specificity.  This is merely an intermediate conclusion on the path to assessing their projec-
tion as a whole.
173 See Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 151, at 1023.
174 Another complication lurks for patents examined before 2007: in KSR v. Teleflex, the
Supreme Court relaxed the burden necessary to prove a claim is obvious. See KSR Int’l Co.
v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415, 419 (2007).  Approximately one-third of the obviousness
events in our dataset (541 of 1620 claim invalidations) involved patents that were last
examined under pre-KSR law but were invalidated under post-KSR law.  However, this
change in law between examination and litigation turns out to have very little explanatory
power when it comes to our results. See infra note 175.
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In light of this, one might expect that there would be hardly any Cate-
gory 1 invalidations—that is, cases in which district courts find claims obvious
based entirely on prior art that was considered during examination.  And yet
such cases do exist.  In about 14% of obviousness events, the district court
relied exclusively on prior art cited on the face of the patent.175  These “same
art” obviousness invalidations are dominated by cases in which the court
relied on a small number of references—80% of these involved only one or
two prior art references in total.  This is an intuitive result: it was much more
likely that the examiner knew of all the relevant references when a smaller
number of references were relevant in the first place.
In the other 86% of cases, the district court relied on one or more refer-
ences that were unknown at the time of examination:
FIGURE 9: OBVIOUSNESS AND UNCITED ART
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Figure 9 tabulates obviousness events based on the number of references
relied on by the court that were uncited in examination.  The first column—
zero uncited references—corresponds to the 14% of obviousness events in
which the court relied exclusively on prior art known to the PTO during
examination.  By contrast, 29% of obviousness events relied on a single refer-
ence unknown to the PTO, and 57% involved two or more such references.
The uncited prior art relied upon by district courts spans the gamut of
the prior art categories.  Because obviousness invalidations can draw on mul-
175 This number (and all those that follow in the main text of this Section) excludes the
8% of obviousness events for which we could not determine the prior art underlying the
court’s determination. See supra Figure 2.  We cannot predict how these cases of unknown
prior art might affect our results, but the magnitude of any effect would be small.
One might suspect that these invalidations—in which the court found a claim obvious
in light of prior art already known during examination—were largely directed at patents
examined before the Supreme Court revisited the obviousness standard in KSR. See supra
note 174.  This turns out not to be the case: roughly 79% of this group were issued after
KSR.
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tiple references, this data is difficult to summarize concisely.  However, one
can get a rough sense of the distribution of uncited art in each category:
FIGURE 10: OBVIOUSNESS AND UNCITED ART
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The dark gray columns in Figure 10 illustrate the percentage of all obvi-
ousness events that rely upon any uncited prior art in each category.  For
perspective, the lighter columns illustrate the percentage of all obviousness
events that rely on any art in that category—cited or uncited.  (These are
provided for perspective only and should not be used to infer the percentage
of art that was cited or uncited within each category.)176  As Figure 10 shows,
there are substantial numbers of uncited references across all prior art
categories.
Though Category 1 represents a small share of obviousness invalidations,
the good news is that the prior art currently missing in examination is fre-
quently amenable to search.  In contrast with anticipation, Category 2 invali-
dations dominate obviousness in the district court.  Somewhere between 45%
and 51% of obviousness invalidations relied on art that was unknown during
examination, but that missing art was exclusively in the categories of patents
or traditional publications.177  Reliance on unknown and unsearchable prior
art was comparatively rare: somewhere between 35% and 41% of obviousness
invalidations were in Category 3.  In theory, then, perfect search combined
176 To be clear, comparing those numbers directly would not yield the percentage of art
cited during examination.  For example, suppose that every single obviousness invalidation
relied on a pair of printed publications—one cited and one uncited.  In that case, the
percentage of invalidations relying on any printed publications would be 100% and the
percentage of invalidations relying on any uncited printed publications would also be
100%.  But it would be wrong to infer that all the invalidating printed publications were
uncited.
177 The range of uncertainty here is due to the 20% of obviousness events that cited a
publication that defied further classification. See supra Figure 4.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-2\NDL207.txt unknown Seq: 50  7-JAN-20 14:54
886 notre dame law review [vol. 95:2
with perfect appreciation could preclude somewhere between 59% and 65%
of district court obviousness events.
Compared to anticipation, this increased upper limit makes Frakes and
Wasserman’s prediction appear somewhat more plausible when it comes to
precluding obviousness invalidations.  Their estimated 44% reduction in the
rate of patent litigation would be just about two-thirds of the theoretical max-
imum (65%) suggested by our district court invalidity data.  Though we can-
not rule this out, it certainly seems optimistic.
On the other hand, Lemley’s original 10% prediction again appears to
err on the side of being too low.  A larger share of district court obviousness
invalidation (14%) relied only on art already in the examination record.
Another 23% of obviousness events could have been precluded by combining
known prior art only with U.S. patents (a stricter subset of Category 2).  In
combination, this suggests that perfect appreciation of the most accessible,
easily searchable documents could have precluded 37% of obviousness
events.  As above, we cannot say with certainty how much of these gains could
be achieved by doubling examination time.  But unlocking even a modest
share of them would result in a reduction in litigation exceeding Lemley’s
prediction.
* * *
In sum, our district court invalidity data suggests that the effects of
increasing examination time would fall somewhere in between the two poles
staked by prior scholars.  On the one hand, Lemley’s prediction appears
implausibly pessimistic—easily more than 10% of invalidation events could
be precluded through basic improvements to patent examination.  On the
other hand, Frakes and Wasserman’s prediction comes uncomfortably close
to the apparent limit on the number of district court invalidity events that
could be avoided through examination.  An exhaustive search of all world-
wide patents and traditional publications combined with perfect appreciation
of those and other already cited references would preclude between 52% and
55% of all district court invalidations.  While we cannot rule a 44% reduction
out of hand, it seems quite optimistic to expect a doubling of examination
time to come so close to the upper limit.
Our departure from Lemley is easy to explain: as he acknowledged at
the time, his 10% figure was simply an assumption, one made to facilitate a
calculation exercise in the absence of data.178  Now that we have some data,
it should not come as a surprise that we might reach a different conclusion.
Our distance from Frakes and Wasserman requires a bit more explora-
tion, since their prediction is based not just on data, but on a careful and
expansive study of the examination process during a largely overlapping time
period.179  One possible explanation is the “strategic litigant” bias acknowl-
edged above—the possibility that challengers would avoid Category 1 art
178 See Lemley, supra note 21, at 1509, 1511–14.
179 See Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 151, at 995–98.
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when Category 2 or Category 3 art was available as an alternative.  But there
are several reasons to doubt that this alone would align our predictions.
First, reliance on prior art in Category 1 was already surprisingly high, sug-
gesting that litigants’ strategic interest in avoiding this category may not be as
great as we expected.  Second, to alter our predictions, challengers would not
only need to be relying on uncited art when cited art was also available, but
specifically relying on activities and nontraditional publications to the exclusion
of cited prior art.  (That is, they would need to be choosing Category 3 art
over Category 1 art, not just dispreferring Category 1 in general.)  Though
this is certainly possible, we note that there are counterbalancing doctrinal
hurdles to qualifying activity and nontraditional publications as prior art.
From a challenger’s point of view, these might offset the strategic benefits of
invoking uncited prior art.180  Finally, the effect of this “strategic litigant”
bias would have to be quite large before Frakes and Wasserman’s prediction
ceases to look optimistic.  Suppose, for example, that 10% of all our observed
invalidations were reclassified from Category 3 to Category 1.  That would
make somewhere between 62% and 65% of patent litigation potentially avoid-
able through examination. Nonetheless, Frakes and Wasserman’s estimate of
a 44% reduction in patent litigation would nonetheless constitute two-thirds
of the preclusion available by combining perfect search with perfect
appreciation.
A more plausible explanation for our divergence from Frakes and Was-
serman is that we are predicting two subtly different things.  Strictly speaking,
Frakes and Wasserman’s 44% estimation is based on the relationship
between investment in examination and case filings.181  They then assume
that the percentage of cases reaching a given stage (for example, close of
discovery, claim construction, summary judgment, trial, etc.) would remain
the same.182  Our data, by contrast, observes litigation at a very late stage in
the process—when the court actually finds a claim invalid.  One way of recon-
ciling our predictions, therefore, is to expect that the court cases precluded
by increasing examination time will disproportionately be ones that would
have ended at an early stage anyway.  This would make it possible for case
filings to go down 44% as Frakes and Wasserman predicted, with decisions of
invalidity going down by a more modest percentage.
This complication has two important consequences.  First, the cost of
litigation increases the further it progresses.  So if it is true that the cases
avoided by doubling examination time will tend to be ones that would have
ended at an early stage anyway, that will reduce the predicted cost savings
obtained by making this additional investment in examination.  Given that
Frakes and Wasserman’s quantified cost-benefit case for doubling examina-
180 See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
181 Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 151, at 995–96.
182 Avoidance of litigation proceeding to claim construction accounts for about 24% of
Frakes and Wasserman’s predicted cost savings, while avoidance of litigation proceeding to
trial accounts for about 16%. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Irrational Igno-
rance at the Patent Office, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1, online app. at 17 tbl.A7 (2019).
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tion time hangs by a rather slim margin,183 this reduction in predicted bene-
fits could imperil the case for the additional investment.  Alternatively, it may
require specification of other expected benefits in order to justify the
increased expenditure.
Second, this complication affects how we should measure the success of
Frakes and Wasserman’s proposal, should it be implemented.  If the PTO
increases examination time, we should expect to see a significant reduction
in the number of patent cases filed some years down the road.  But we should
not be surprised if the number of patents invalidated in court annually
remains a more resilient figure.
V. REASONS FOR INFERENTIAL CAUTION AND FUTURE WORK
A risk for any study of this type is that observations of the past may fail to
accurately predict the future.  This Part briefly discusses several ways in which
the patent system was observed to be changing during the study period and
introduces related questions requiring further study.
A. Invalidity Basis Is Changing Over Time
The first trend that must be noted is that the legal basis for judicial inval-
idation of issued patents changed dramatically between 2011 and 2017.
While the ratio of anticipation events to obviousness events remained sta-
ble,184 the rates of both forms of invalidity have declined overall, particularly
compared to other legal grounds:
FIGURE 11: PATENT-LEVEL INVALIDITY EVENTS
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183 See Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 151, at 1021.
184 See supra Section III.A.
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Figure 11 illustrates the number of patent-level invalidity events per year
by legal basis.  For ease of representation, anticipation and obviousness are
grouped into a single category, “Prior Art.”  Written description and enable-
ment are also represented in a single merged category.  Data for the end of
2017 is extrapolated based on the first six months of 2017.
Most importantly for this study, the number of patents invalidated on
anticipation or obviousness grounds has fallen dramatically over the last sev-
eral years.  From 2011 to 2014, between 80 and 100 patents per year exper-
ienced invalidity based on prior art.  This number slid to 72 in 2015 and was
down to just 44 in 2016.  Moreover, district courts appeared to be on track to
invalidate about 44 patents on prior art grounds in 2017.  In other words,
over the course of the study period, the rate of anticipation and obviousness
invalidations fell off more than 50%.
There are several potential explanations for this decline.  One is that
patents vulnerable on prior art grounds are instead being invalidated on a
different legal basis.  As Figure 11 shows, invalidations related to patentable
subject matter185 surged around 2014, and invalidations based on indefinite-
ness186 also briefly peaked in 2015.  (These trends correspond with several
major Supreme Court cases in those areas handed down around the same
time.)187  Another possible explanation for the decline in anticipation and
obviousness invalidations is that the new administrative challenge procedure
called inter partes review (IPR) has partially displaced the role of courts in
this area.  The first IPR petitions were accepted on September 16, 2012, and,
by the end of the study period, IPR had become an important tool for chal-
lenging patents on prior art grounds.  In both 2015 and 2016, around 380
patents per year experienced prior-art-based invalidations in IPR proceed-
ings.188  Either explanation could plausibly account for the thirty to forty
annual prior art invalidity events that went missing from district courts dur-
ing the same time period.
Whatever the cause, the trends reflected in Figure 11 may, over time,
also affect the composition of prior art relied upon in district courts.  For
example, the surge in patentable subject matter invalidations has had a dev-
astating effect on patents for software and medical diagnostics, at least in the
short term.  If anticipation or obviousness invalidations in those fields were
particularly likely to draw on art of one type or another, the overall picture of
prior art in district court may change as well.  We do not yet have enough
185 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
186 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
187 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352, 2355, 2358 (2014) (chang-
ing law of patentable subject matter for “abstract ideas”); Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instru-
ments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014) (changing law of definiteness); Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70–73 (2012) (changing law of
patentable subject matter for “laws of nature”).
188 IPR proceedings invalidated 381 patents on anticipation or obviousness grounds in
2015.  In 2016, the number was 386.  This data is courtesy of Lex Machina. LEX MACHINA,
supra note 87.
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data to test for this possibility or predict its effects.  Therefore, future studies
will be necessary to determine whether the composition of prior art in the
district court is changing as a result of these trends.
B. IPR Selection Effects
While we cannot determine how much of the decline of district court
anticipation and obviousness invalidations is attributable to IPR, we can test
one theory of how IPR might be affecting district courts.  By statute, IPR chal-
lenges can be based only on patents or printed publications.189  A challenger
seeking to invalidate a patent based on activity prior art must therefore pro-
ceed to district court, while a challenger drawing only on patents and printed
publications may proceed in either IPR or the district court.190
IPR is cheaper than district court litigation and offers a number of pro-
cedural advantages for patent challengers.191  Therefore, one might expect
to see a reverse selection effect in district courts following the advent of IPR:
a decline in the number of anticipation and obviousness invalidations overall,
coupled with an increase in the percentage of invalidations relying on activity.
While the number of district court anticipation and obviousness invali-
dations has fallen in recent years, the second part of this prediction has not
materialized.  Indeed, there has been no noticeable increase in the percent-
age of district court cases relying on activity prior art:
FIGURE 12: ACTIVITY PRIOR ART IN DISTRICT COURT
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189 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012).
190 Activity prior art is admissible in a different administrative challenge proceeding
called “post-grant review.” See id. § 321(b).  However, post-grant review is only available for
recently filed patents, and only then for the first nine months following issuance. See id.
§ 321(c).
191 See Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 919–20 (2015).
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Figure 12 illustrates the percentage of patent-level invalidity decisions
relying on activity prior art.192  A decision is counted as relying on activity
prior art if it cites activity prior art to support the invalidation of any claim,
whether for purposes of anticipation or obviousness.  As Figure 12 shows, this
number has remained remarkably stable throughout the advent of IPR.
There is no evidence of the reverse selection effect one might have
predicted.
This does not eliminate the possibility that IPR may be having an effect
on the composition of cases litigated to a decision in district court.  But
whatever the interaction is, it has not resulted in the straightforward increase
in activity-based invalidations in court that one might have expected.
C. Changes in Prior Art Rules
Finally, it is also important to note that the 2011 America Invents Act
(AIA) made several changes to the prior art rules,193 and these changes
could affect the kinds of prior art district courts rely upon in the future.  The
new prior art rules apply based on an application’s effective filing, so the rule
changes had no immediate effect on existing patents.194  Because almost all
of the invalidation events in this study involved applications of the pre-AIA
law, we must consider the possibility that applications of post-AIA law may
rely on different kinds of prior art.
The most significant reform in the AIA was the move from a first-to-
invent to a first-to-file system.195  Though this was obviously an important
change for patent prosecutors and litigators, it is not clear whether it will
have any effect on the kinds of prior knowledge and activities that ultimately
qualify as prior art.  Even if it does have such an effect, it is not clear in which
direction it would operate.
Aside from the change to first-to-file, the AIA made some subtle adjust-
ments in the rules for what may qualify as activity prior art.  The geographic
limitation that the invalidating public use or sale must occur within the
United States was eliminated,196 which would tend to make it easier for art to
qualify in those categories.  At the same time, the AIA amendments elimi-
nated the “prior invention by another” prior art path.197  It is too soon to
make any predictions whether, on net, activity prior art will become more or
less prominent in district court going forward.
192 The units of analysis here are patent-decisional document combinations—a single
court decisional document invalidating two patents would correspond to two observations,
as would two decisional documents involving the same patent.
193 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified
at 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012))
194 Id. § 3(n)(1).
195 Id. § 3.
196 Robert P. Merges, Priority and Novelty Under the AIA, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1023,
1027 (2012).
197 It appears that few district court decisions will be affected by the removal of this
prior art path. See supra notes 126–32 and accompanying text.
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This raises a more general point.  The possibility of future legal change
is an unavoidable, inherent risk for a study of this kind.  We cannot rule out
the possibility of future legislation or overruling of precedent that may have a
significant effect on how district courts rely on prior art in the future.  There
is nothing we can do besides acknowledge this risk and plan for further
study.
CONCLUSION
Overall, district court litigation outcomes present a mixed picture when
it comes to the questions of interest in this study.  At both a claim and patent
level, invalidations appear to be consistently balanced between anticipation
and obviousness.  The former group bears many of the indicia of publicly
beneficial error correction.  A high percentage of anticipation invalidations
involve the plaintiff or defendant’s own prior work, and it appears that reli-
ance on obscure prior art is quite rare.
The same conclusions do not appear to hold for cases of obviousness.  A
significant number of obviousness invalidations rely on obscure prior art, sug-
gesting that they may be less likely to provide incentivizing error correction.
However, current policies encouraging testing of obviousness may nonethe-
less be defensible on other grounds and will require further study.
Finally, the case for increasing examination scrutiny remains ambiguous.
While the volume of patent litigation that could be precluded by more exam-
ination time appears to be larger than has been previously assumed, it is
likely smaller than other scholars have recently predicted.  Reforms to
increase examination resources may yet be justified on other grounds, but it
does not appear that increased examination expenditure can be justified
through litigation savings alone.
